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Abstract 
 
This study examines the effects of the degradation experienced in the steel drywell containment 
at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.  Specifically, the structural integrity of the con-
tainment shell is examined in terms of the stress limits using the ASME Boiler and Pressure Ves-
sel (B&PV) Code, Section III, Division I, Subsection NE, and examined in terms of buckling 
(stability) using the ASME B&PV Code Case N-284.  Degradation of the steel containment shell 
(drywell) at Oyster Creek was first observed during an outage in the mid-1980s.  Subsequent in-
spections discovered reductions in the shell thickness due to corrosion throughout the contain-
ment.  Specifically, significant corrosion occurred in the sandbed region of the lower sphere.  
Since the presence of the wet sand provided an environment which supported corrosion, a series 
of analyses were conducted by GE Nuclear Energy in the early 1990s.  These analyses examined 
the effects of the degradation on the structural integrity.  The current study adopts many of the 
same assumptions and data used in the previous GE study.  However, the additional computa-
tional recourses available today enable the construction of a larger and more sophisticated struc-
tural model. 
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Executive Summary 
The Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station is a GE Mark I BWR which began operation in 
1969.  It is located in New Jersey and is operated by AmerGen/Exelon.  The drywell portion of 
the containment vessel consists of a free-standing welded steel shell with an upper cylindrical 
section atop a lower spherical section.  The steel containment rests on a reinforced concrete base 
mat and is surrounded by a reinforced concrete reactor building. 
Corrosion of the steel drywell containment shell at Oyster Creek was first observed during an 
outage in November 1986 (GE, 1991a).  Subsequent inspections discovered reductions in the 
shell thickness due to general corrosion in many regions of the drywell containment.  Significant 
corrosion occurred in the sandbed region of the lower sphere.  The sandbed is located below the 
ventlines that lead down to the torus section of the containment and just above the concrete base 
mat.  A small pocket of sand was originally placed adjacent to the steel shell at the base to pro-
vide a transition, or “cushion”, as the shell emerges from being embedded in concrete.  Inspec-
tions concluded that water leakage occurred through the gap between the reactor building and the 
drywell shell and collected in the sandbed region.  Since the wet sand provided an environment 
which supported corrosion, the Licensee embarked on a series of corrective actions including 
removing the sand from the sandbed region, cleaning and coating the affected surfaces, and seal-
ing the gap between the containment vessel and the concrete to prevent further penetration by 
water.  The Licensee also implemented periodic re-inspections of selected areas of the vessel to 
monitor the progression, if any, of the corrosion damage. 
Prior to the removal of the sand from the sandbed region, the Licensee tasked GE Nuclear with 
assessing the vessel in its degraded state to determine whether or not the degradation prevented 
the vessel from performing its intended design function.  They concluded that the degraded dry-
well shell, with the sand removed, still satisfied the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel (B&PV) 
Code stress and stability limits, albeit with a reduced design pressure.  The sand was removed 
and based on subsequent inspections, the Licensee has claimed that there is no on-going corro-
sion in the sandbed region of the drywell shell. Inspections have, however, discovered ongoing 
corrosion in the portions of the drywell above the sandbed region (sphere and cylinder).   
In July of 2005, the Licensee submitted an application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion (NRC) to extend the operating life of the plant from 40 to 60 years (extend from 2009 to 
2029).  The NRC Office of Reactor Regulation (NRR) commissioned Sandia National Laborato-
ries (SNL) to perform an evaluation of the degraded containment vessel to determine if the Li-
censee’s contention, that the current known condition of the vessel and the progressive damage 
expected over the extended service life did not compromise the design function or licensing ba-
sis, was reasonable.  The scope of the analyses performed by Sandia was defined by NRC staff 
and the procedures employed were discussed with NRC staff throughout the project. 
In this evaluation, Sandia developed a detailed three-dimensional (3D) finite element model of 
the drywell containment vessel using information provided by the NRC and the Licensee.  
Analyses for the governing load combinations were performed for the vessel in its’ original, as-
designed state and for a representation of the vessel in an approximation of the current degraded 
state.  Based on previous work performed at Sandia (Cherry and Smith, 2001, Spencer et. al, 
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2006), modeling of the corrosion damage was represented by uniform shell thinning.  The de-
graded condition of the sandbed region in the model is based on the measurements performed in 
1993 (GPU Nuclear, 1993).  These measurements were taken prior to the application of the pro-
tective coating.  The shell thicknesses of the model in the sandbed region are based on averages 
of the available measurements. Assuming these measurements made in the accessible portions of 
the sandbed are representative of the entire region, the average of the measurements should be 
conservatively biased since the thickness measurements were only made at the thinnest points 
(by visual inspection).  No statistical analysis of the Licensee’s in-situ thickness measurements 
was performed.  Rather, the averaging procedure used to develop thicknesses was based on engi-
neering judgment.  No additional reduction in thickness due to ongoing corrosion during the 20-
year plant life extension was considered in the sandbed region, accepting the Licensee’s conten-
tion that corrosion processes have been arrested.  The thicknesses in the upper portions of the 
degraded drywell model were based on the additional thickness measurements performed by the 
Licensee over the past 20 years and included an estimate of future corrosion by linear extrapola-
tion of past corrosion rates.   
The models were then used to evaluate the structural integrity of the vessel in terms of the stress 
limits specified in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code, Section III, Division I, 
Subsection NE, and in terms of buckling (stability) limits specified in ASME B&PV Code Case 
N-284.  The analyses performed in this study aim only to independently confirm the general con-
clusions reached in a previous study performed by GE Nuclear Energy in the early 1990s.  Two 
important points regarding the current analysis are important to recognize: 
• The original design of the containment based on the analyses by the Licensee and GE and 
subsequent analyses of the degraded vessel have been accepted by the NRC and are part 
of the current licensing basis. 
• The current analysis by Sandia cannot, and is not intended to, reproduce the results of the 
original licensing basis analyses.  As such, the baseline (i.e. un-degraded) analysis was 
performed so that the effects of the degradation could be clearly isolated.  The results of 
the current analysis should, therefore, focus more on the relative reduction in design mar-
gin due to the corrosion modeled, than the absolute stresses or stability limits which are 
calculated.  This relative reduction in margin, examined together with the current licens-
ing basis and additional relevant information, should be considered by the NRC staff in 
the development of the basis to accept or reject the Licensee’s application for an ex-
tended license.  By itself, the analysis performed by Sandia cannot be used for this deci-
sion. 
A significant amount of data, primarily regarding the external loads on the drywell shell, was 
extracted directly from the GE analyses due to insufficient plant information to allow independ-
ent calculation of these loads.  Every effort was made to use the best available information for 
the current models and analyses.  However, since the GE analyses and the current analyses use a 
different modeling approach, the data taken directly from the GE analysis was of necessity modi-
fied to fit the current approach. 
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The purpose of the Sandia analyses was to assess the effects of degradation on the stress and 
buckling behavior for the drywell containment.  In this context, the results of the analyses show 
that the degradation does not result in a definitive violation of the stresses or buckling criterion 
in the ASME code given the modeling procedures and assumptions outlined in this report.   
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1.  Introduction 
This study examines the effects of the degradation experienced in the steel drywell containment 
at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant.  Specifically, the structural integrity of the containment 
shell is examined in terms of the stress limits using the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel 
(B&PV) Code, Section III, Division I, Subsection NE, and examined in terms of buckling (sta-
bility) using the ASME B&PV Code Case N-284.  
The analyses performed in this study aim to independently confirm the general conclusions 
reached in a previous study performed by GE Nuclear Energy in the early 1990s.  Since the GE 
analyses and the analyses performed here use different models, and in some cases, different as-
sumptions, a direct comparison to the previous GE analysis is not the intent of this effort. In ad-
dition, a significant amount of data was taken directly from the GE analysis and applied or 
modified as required for the current study.  This was necessary when information was not avail-
able, or was not made available, to be independently verified.  Within the project schedule, all 
efforts were made to use the best available information for the models and analysis used in the 
current study.  All stress and buckling analyses were performed for both a representation of the 
containment in its degraded condition and in its original, as-built, condition.  The study of the as-
built conditions provides base-line analyses to assess the effects of degradation on the stress and 
buckling behavior for the containment.   
Degradation of the steel drywell containment shell at Oyster Creek was first observed during an 
outage in November 1986 (GE, 1991a).  Subsequent inspections discovered reductions in the 
shell thickness due to corrosion throughout the containment.  Specifically, significant corrosion 
occurred in the sandbed region of the lower sphere.  The sandbed is located below the ventlines 
that lead down to the torus section of the containment.  The small pocket of sand was originally 
placed adjacent to the steel shell at the base to provide a transition as the shell emerges from be-
ing embedded in concrete.  Water leakage through the gap between the reactor building and the 
drywell shell collected in the sandbed region.  Since the presence of the wet sand provided an 
environment which supported corrosion, a series of analyses were conducted by GE Nuclear En-
ergy to examine the effects of removing the sand.  GE determined that the degraded drywell shell 
with removal of the sand was acceptable based on ASME B&PV stress and stability limits.  
Therefore, the sand was removed and the surface of the drywell shell epoxy coated to protect the 
surface from additional degradation.  Subsequent inspections have supported the claim that there 
is no on-going corrosion in the sandbed region of the drywell shell.  However, inspections have 
shown the existence of ongoing corrosion in the upper portions of the drywell (sphere and cylin-
der).   
Thickness measurements have been performed during refueling outages at the plant over the last 
20 years.  The UT measurement data used to estimate the thickness of the containment shell was 
limited to a few selected regions in the sandbed and throughout the remaining containment.  
Since only a very small percentage of the total shell surface has been measured, a number of as-
sumptions were made in this study to assign appropriate shell thicknesses throughout the drywell 
model.  These are described in more detail in subsequent sections.  
 The degraded Oyster Creek drywell shell was analyzed in this study using a full three-
dimensional (3D) finite element model.  The previous analyses by GE employed both an axi-
symmetric and a 36o slice model of the drywell.  These analyses were conducted in the 1990-91 
timeframe and were constrained by the computational limits of the day.  Due to a significant in-
crease in computational power relative to the time of the GE analysis, a full 3D model was cre-
ated here and is described in detail in this report. 
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2.  Oyster Creek Drywell Finite Element Model 
A full three-dimensional (3D) finite element model of the Oyster Creek drywell was developed 
for this study.  A full 3D, 360o, model enables a more sophisticated analysis which includes 
structural detail that account for the asymmetries of the containment vessel.  It also provides for 
a more realistic representation of the boundary conditions, thicknesses transitions, and the spatial 
variation of the degradation. 
Two reports summarizing the work performed by GE (GE, 1991a and 1991b) along with a par-
tial set of drywell structural drawings (CB&I, 1980) were the two resources used to develop the 
model geometry.  Unfortunately, many of the resources available to the GE analysts were not 
available, or were not made available in time for use in this study.  In a number of instances, this 
has led to the need to assume information required to complete this program.  For example, 
many items related to the structural loads documented by GE could not be confirmed or recre-
ated.  In these cases, the information that was available from the GE study and/or other sources 
was used, combined, or adapted for use in the current analysis.  These assumptions and proce-
dures are documents throughout this report, and are summarized in a section at the end of this 
report.   
2.1  Finite Element Program and Modeling Procedures 
The finite element modeling conducted in this study uses the ABAQUS (ABAQUS, 2004) suite 
of analysis software.  Specifically, Version 6.5-6 of the ABAQUS/Standard general-purpose fi-
nite element program and the ABAQUS/CAE interactive environment are used to perform the 
analyses and to create the solid models and finite element meshes, respectively.  
ABAQUS/Standard is employed since all of the analyses performed here are static.  The CAE 
component of ABAQUS provides an interface for defining the model geometry, material proper-
ties, shell thicknesses, boundary conditions, loadings, and meshing.  After the analysis is com-
pleted using ABAQUS/Standard, the Visualization module within CAE (also identified as 
ABAQUS/Viewer) is used to examine the analysis results.   
The analyses performed here include geometric nonlinearities, also known as large-displacement 
or finite strain analyses.  When applying geometric nonlinearities to the analysis, the element 
formulation at each load step is performed using the current configuration (e.g. deformed shape).  
A combination of standard, “S4R”, 4-noded, and “S3R, 3-noded, reduced integration shell ele-
ments are used here to model the drywell.  The meshing technique used is identified as “quad-
dominated” in ABAQUS/CAE.  The method meshes the geometry using quad (4-noded) ele-
ments, but does introduce tri (3-noded) elements in regions where introducing a quad element 
would result in a severely distorted element.   
Shell elements are used in modeling when the thickness dimension is significantly less than the 
in-plane dimensions.  Typically, the reference surface of the shell element is set at the mid-
section, or centerline, of the structure being modeled.  The thickness of the shell is set in the 
  
 
18
“Section” definitions within ABAQUS.  Each nodes in a given shell elements have six degrees-
of-freedom, three translational and three rotational.   
The use of shell elements introduces discontinuities at the interface between plates of differing 
thickness.  The actual structure also included discontinuities at these locations due to the inter-
face of plates of differing thickness.  These interfaces often include a small tapered region.  Here, 
the thicker plate is gradually reduced in thickness over a length on the order of the plate thick-
ness, and welded to the thinner plate.  In the models developed in this study, a small region is 
included at the interface of plates of differing thickness to represent the transition region in the 
actual structure.  This “transition” region is set to a thickness equal to the average of the plates 
on either side. The length of the model transition is based on the actual, or estimated, transition 
length given in the structural drawings (CB&I, 1980). 
2.2  Geometry 
The Oyster Creek reactor building contains a GE BWR Nuclear Steam Supply System with a 
steel Mark I containment vessel.  Figure 2-1 illustrates the pressure suppression system which 
includes the pressure suppression chamber (torus) and the drywell (containment vessel) con-
nected with a series of ventlines.  Figure 2-1 also shows the positioning of the containment ves-
sel within the reactor building (one half of the reactor building has been removed to view the 
containment vessel) and a detailed view of the sandbed region below the ventlines. Since the 
drywell is not exactly a symmetric structure, it is modeled in full for this study.  The series of 
ventlines which connect the drywell with the torus includes a flexible bellow (not shown) at the 
interface between the ventline and the torus.  Since these bellows prevent significant structural 
interaction, the torus shell was not included in the model and is shown in Figure 2-1 for illustra-
tive purposes only.  As stated previously, the ventlines are modeled down past the interface with 
the torus, ending at the intersection with the ventline header.   
Figure 2-2 shows the extent of the structure modeled for the current analysis.  As stated above, 
the torus is not included in the model.  The drywell is modeled from an elevation of 2’-3” (2 feet, 
3 inches) to an elevation of 107’-9”.  At the top of the drywell, the head region is a 2:1 ellipse.  
Below the head, the drywell cylinder has an inside diameter of 33 feet (33’) and the drywell 
sphere has an inside diameter of 70 feet (70’).  The cylindrical and spherical regions are joined 
by a thickened knuckle.  The equator of the drywell sphere is located at elevation 37’-3”.  The 
largest drywell penetration is the personnel lock/equipment hatch located at an elevation of 27’-
6”.  The centerline of the ventlines extends down to an elevation of 0’-6”.  The sandbed region is 
located in the lower sphere of the drywell shell just below the ventlines.  Below the sandbed, part 
of the lower sphere and the entire bottom sphere are completely contained within concrete on 
both sides below elevation 8’-11.25” (lower sphere extends down to elevation 6’-10.25”).  Addi-
tional details related to the geometry, shell thickness, boundary conditions, and loadings are pro-
vided throughout the next several subsections.  The plate thicknesses given in these sections are 
for the drywell in its as-built state.  The thinning due to the corrosion that exists in the shell is 
described in Section 2.6  
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Figure 2-1.  Oyster Creek Reactor Building and Containment 
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Figure 2-2.  Extent of Drywell and Ventlines Including the Current Model (Approximate Elevations) 
2.2.1  Drywell Head, Cylinder, Stiffeners, and Knuckle 
Figure 2-3 shows the drywell head residing at the top of the structure up to an elevation of 107’-
9”.  The 2:1 ellipse that defines the geometry of the head region extends down to an elevation of 
99’-6”.  The head region has a shell thickness of 1.1875”.  In the region below the head, the 
flange assembly includes a double tongue-and-groove seal at an elevation of 94’-9”.  At this ele-
vation, the head separates from the drywell during refueling as shown in Figure 2-4.  For the 
analyses of the refueling load case, a separate model was created that has an identical geometry 
to the full model with the exception of the head being removed.  In the full model, the flange as-
sembly region is assigned the same thickness at the head, 1.1875”.  The geometry of the flange 
assembly is complex with the actual thickness varying from 1.25” to 1.5”.   
Since the thickness dimension is not represented when using shell elements, the location of the 
shell in the model is defined in space at the mid-section of the actual shell.  This leads to the ra-
dius of the flange assembly to be 16’-6.59375”.  This number is computed by adding the actual 
inside radius in this region, 16’-6”, to one half of the shell thickness, or 1.1875”/2.    
Underneath the flange assembly, the shell thickness is reduced to 0.64” below elevation 92’-
2.75”.  The model also includes a thin “transition” region between the flange assembly region 
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and the lower cylinder.  In the actual structure, the steel plate is tapered from one thickness to the 
next over a short distance.  The transition region represents this tapered region and is assigned a 
thickness equal to the average, 0.91375”, of the two surrounding plates (e.g. 1.1875” and 0.64”). 
Since the inside radius of the cylinder remains constant and the thickness of the lower cylinder is 
less than the flange assembly region, the centerline of the shell is shifted inward producing a ra-
dius of 16’-6.32”. 
 
Figure 2-3.  Head and Cylinder Shell Thickness and Dimensions 
 
Figure 2-4.  Model with Head Removed for Refueling 
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The cylinder region of the drywell also contains several stiffeners.  Figure 2-5 and Table 2-1 
summarizes the stiffener’s dimensions and positions.  Figure 2-5 gives an inside “cut” view of 
the cylinder.  Half of Stiffener-0 resides within the cylinder and half resides outside the cylinder. 
 Stiffeners 1, 3, 4, and 5 are positioned completely within the cylinder.  Only Stiffener-2 and 2a 
are attached completely to the outside of the cylinder.  Stiffener-2 is connected directly to the 
outside surface of the cylinder shell.  Stiffener-2a is thinner than Stiffener-2 and is attached to 
the outer extent of Stiffener-2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-5.  Cylinder Stiffener Layout 
 
 
 
Table 2-1. Cylinder Stiffeners 
Stiffener Elevation Length (inches) Thickness (inches) Orientation 
Stiffener-0 96’-7.875” 12.5 2.25 half & half 
Stiffener-1 94’-3” 12 1.0 inside 
Stiffener-2 92’-8.5” 7 2.75 outside 
Stiffener-2a 92’-8.5” 7.38 1.0 outside 
Stiffener-3 88’-8.5” 6 0.5 inside 
Stiffener-4 84’-11.8” 6 0.75 inside 
Stiffener-5 80’-6.3” 6 0.75 inside 
 
  
 
1 June 21, 2006, conference call between Sandia National Laboratories, NRC, and Exelon. 
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The knuckle illustrated in Figure 2-6 connects the drywell’s cylindrical region to the upper 
sphere.  A thin transition region is introduced between the cylinder and knuckle and between the 
knuckle and upper sphere.  The upper fillet portion of the knuckle has a 72” radius.  Below an 
elevation of 66’-5.77”, the knuckle fillet is joined to the upper sphere with a linear section of the 
knuckle.  The thickness of the entire knuckle (elevation 65’-4.27” to 71’-6.28”) is set at 2.5625”. 
 This is the minimum specified thickness in this region as stated in the previous GE study (GE, 
1991a).  However, the structural drawings (CB&I, 1980) and other sections of the GE study in-
dicate a knuckle thickness of 2.625”.  The lower value of 2.5625” is adopted for the undegraded 
thickness of the knuckle since that value was confirmed1 and is more conservative. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-6.  Knuckle Region Shell Thickness
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2.2.2  Drywell Sphere & Personnel Lock/Equipment Door 
The largest section of the drywell is the spherical region which lies below the cylinder.  The 
sphere has an inside radius of 35’ and is composed of four main regions of different thickness.  
Figure 2-7 shows the upper and middle sphere regions.  The upper sphere has a thickness of 
0.722” and the middle sphere was constructed with a thickness of 0.77”.  As mentioned previ-
ously, the position of the shell in the model created here is set at the mid-section of the shell in 
the actual structure.  Therefore, the radii of the upper and middle sphere are 35’-0.361” and 35’-
0.385”, respectively.  The 0.746” thick transition region between the upper and middle sphere 
lies between elevations 50’-11.25” and 50’-10.8”.  At the lower extent of the middle sphere, a 
0.962” transition region connects the middle sphere with the 1.154” thick lower sphere between 
elevations 23’-6.74” and 23’-4.82”.  
 
 
Figure 2-7.  Upper and Middle Sphere Shell Geometry 
 
 
  
 
25
A section of the middle sphere is thickened between azimuths 2.5o and 317.5 o due to the pres-
ence of the personnel lock and equipment hatch penetration as shown in Figure 2-8.  (The values 
for the azimuths were assumed from an examination of the structural drawings (CB&I, 1980).)  
This thickened region is 1.0625” and extends from the lower sphere to the upper sphere (23’-
6.74” to 50’-10.8”).  Transition regions surround the thickened middle sphere on all sides.  The 
transition along the top is 0.89225”, along the vertical sides is 0.91625”, and along the bottom 
(outside of the hatch) is 1.10825”.  There are also two small transition regions at the top corners 
(0.819125”) and two small transition regions at the bottom corners (1.035125”) of the thickened 
middle sphere.  The thickness of these corner regions are weighted averages of the surrounding 
plates.     
Middle Sphere
Thickness = 0.77”
Middle 
Sphere
Thickness
= 0.77”
Thickened Middle Sphere
Thickness = 1.0625”
2.5o Azimuth 317.5o Azimuth
50’-11.25”
50’-10.8”
Elevation
23’-6.74”
23’-4.82”
Lower Sphere Thickness = 1.154”
Personnel Lock
& Equipment Hatch
Azimuth
342o
Elevation
27’-6”
 
Figure 2-8.  Thickened Middle Sphere Geometry 
 
 
Figure 2-9 illustrates the personnel lock and equipment hatch penetration.  The penetration is 10’ 
in diameter and extends from the thickened middle sphere down into the lower sphere.  The cen-
ter of the penetration is located at an elevation of 27’6” and an azimuth of 342o.  Embedded 
within the drywell shell and surrounding the penetration is a 2.625” thick plate.  The outer di-
ameter of this thickened region is approximately 14’-1.5”.  A thin transition region lies between 
this thickened plate surrounding the penetration and the surrounding thickened middle sphere (t 
= 1.84375”) and lower sphere (t = 1.8895”).   
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Figure 2-9.  Personnel Lock and Equipment Hatch Geometry  
 
 
The penetration extends away from the drywell shell to a distance of 41’-6” from the centerline 
of the drywell.  This is the location of a vertical support within the reactor building.  This is dis-
cussed in additional detail in the following section on boundary conditions.  The penetration has 
a thickness of 2.625” at the connection with the drywell shell.  The outer 5’-9” length of the 
penetration has been set to a thickness of 0.5”.  In the actual structure, the thickness of this outer 
region varies and has been set to 0.5” to simplify the model.  Only this outer shell of the penetra-
tion is modeled here.  The internals of the personnel lock and equipment hatch are included 
through applied loads and are described in the loading section.  
Below the middle sphere and the hatch penetration is the 1.154” thick lower sphere region of the 
drywell as shown in Figure 2-10.  The lower sphere extends from an elevation of 23’-4.82” down 
to 6’-10.25” and has a radius of 35’-0.577”.  The section of the lower sphere below an elevation 
of 8’-11.25” is embedded within concrete on both sides.  The lowest extent of the drywell is the 
bottom sphere with a thickness of 0.676” and a radius of 35’-0.338”.  The entire bottom sphere is 
also embedded within concrete.  The sandbed region is located at the bottom of the lower sphere, 
from elevation 8’-11.25” up to 12’-3”.  
  
 
27
 
Figure 2-10.  Lower and Bottom Sphere Geometry 
2.2.3  Ventline and Ventline Jet Deflector 
Within the lower sphere of the drywell, 10 ventlines spaced at 36o connect the torus to the dry-
well.  As shown in Figure 2-11, the elevation of the center of the ventline penetration into the 
drywell shell is 15-6.8”.  (The actual elevation is 15’-7.25”.  The difference is due to round-off 
error in constructing the geometry).  The ventline is 7’-10” in diameter at the intersection with 
the drywell shell and transitions down to a diameter of 6’-6.25”.  As with the personnel lock and 
equipment hatch penetration, the thickness of the drywell shell surrounding the ventline penetra-
tion is thickened.  Here the thickened region is 2.875” with a thin transition zone of 2.0145”.   
 
Figure 2-11.  Drywell Geometry near Ventline Penetration 
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Figure 2-12 illustrates the extent of the ventline modeled in this study.  At the intersection with 
the drywell, a 2.5” thick section of the ventline at a diameter of 7’-10” extends approximately 1’-
3.2” away from the drywell shell.  The diameter of the ventline then transitions down to 6’-6.25” 
with a 0.4375” thick region which extends approximately 1’-11.8”.  A 0.25” thick region then 
extends another 14’-0.7” to a 0.3125” thick section.  This section extends approximately 4’-2.3” 
to a point where the angle of the ventline changes from 38o21’ to 17o from horizontal.  The next 
section of 0.3125” thick ventline is approximately 2’-5.2” in length with a 0.25” thick section 
extending the final 4’-1”.  The center of the end of the ventline is at an elevation of 0’-6”.  The 
ventline ends at the connection with the ventline header.  Springs are attached to the end of the 
ventline to account for the additional stiffness provided by the ventline header.  This is discussed 
in detail in the next section.  Part of the lower section of ventline modeled here is actually con-
tained within the torus and connected with a bellow.  It is assumed that the bellows prevent any 
meaningful structural interaction, and therefore the torus and bellow are not modeled here.   
 
Figure 2-12.  Ventline Geometry 
Figure 2-13 shows the ventline jet deflector included in the current model.  The deflector in-
cludes 20 - 0.875” thick gusset plates that connect the inside of the drywell shell to the 2.31” 
thick deflector plate.  The thickness of the gusset plate could not be identified on the structural 
drawings (CB&I, 1980), and was taken from the value given in the GE report (GE, 1991b).  The 
actual deflector plate is 2.5” thick and includes 189 holes through the thickness of the plate.  
Since including the holes explicitly is beyond the fidelity of this model, the plate was modeled as 
solid with a reduced thickness to maintain a constant volume with the actual plate.  This reduced 
thickness solid plate approximates the membrane stiffness exhibited by the perforated plate due 
to the consistent cross-sectional area (on average). 
 
  
 
29
 
Figure 2-13.  Ventline Deflector Geometry 
The only penetrations explicitly modeled here are the ventlines and the personnel lock and 
equipment hatch.  Other penetrations are included through loads applied to the structure and are 
discussed in the subsequent loading section. 
2.3  Boundary Conditions 
The boundary conditions applied to the current model attempt to approximate the conditions 
within the actual structure.  At the same time, it must be acknowledged that all finite element 
models are idealizations.  The boundary conditions that can be applied to a given model, while 
increasingly realistic and complex, will never exactly represent the complexities in an actual 
structure.   
Here, four boundary condition regions have been created and applied to the model.  Figure 2-14 
shows the fixed region of the drywell shell below elevation 8’-11.25”.  This region is fixed since 
the drywell shell is surrounded by concrete on both sides.  Outside of the drywell, concrete rises 
up to an elevation of 8’-11.25”.  Above the concrete, the sandbed region extends up to an eleva-
tion of 12’-3”.  The sand has been removed from this region and is currently open space.  Within 
the interior of the drywell shell, a concrete floor extends up to an elevation of 10’-3” with curbs 
extending up to 11’-0” below the ventlines and up to 12’3” between the ventlines.  Since the cur-
rent state of the bond between the drywell shell and the concrete inside of the drywell is not 
know to the analyst and because of the absence of concrete outside of the drywell shell, the con-
crete inside of the drywell above an elevation of 8’-11.25” is not accounted for in the model.  
This is believed to be a realistic assumption since the shell deforms outward, away from the inte-
rior concrete, for the load cases examined in this study.   
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Figure 2-14.  Boundary Condition at the Bottom of the Drywell with Cross-section View of Embed-
ded Drywell Shell 
 
Figure 2-15 shows the highlighted ends of the ventlines where the degrees of freedom are fixed 
against rotation and lateral displacement.  Springs are attached to the ends of the ventlines in the 
vertical and radial directions.  Since the spring constant used by GE at the ends of the ventlines 
to represent the compliance of the ventline header connection were not documented, a sub-
analysis of the ventline header was performed for this study to estimate the stiffness provided to 
the ends of the ventlines.  Figure 2-16 shows the ventline header and the submodel used to de-
termine the spring constants to be applied to the ends of the ventlines in the main model.  A sec-
tion of the ventline header was extracted and analyzed with symmetry boundary conditions at 
one end and fixed displacement at the location of the ventline header columns.  The end of the 
ventline header submodel that intersects with the ventline is fixed laterally and unit displace-
ments are imposed in the radial and vertical directions.  The reactions along this edge are 
summed and multiplied by two to account for the section of the ventline header on the other side 
of the ventline.  The summed reactions in the radial and vertical directions are the resistance that 
would be applied to the ventline from the ventline header.  The springs acting vertically are ap-
plied at two points with magnitudes of 2332 kips/in.  The vertical springs are located on each 
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side of the end of the ventline as shown in Figure 2-17.  Figure 2-17 also shows the springs that 
act radially at the top and bottom of the end of the ventline.  These springs have a magnitude of 
519.9 kips/in.  These points of application were selected since the largest reactions resisting the 
imposed displacements are the located near these locations.   
 
Fixed Against Rotation and 
Lateral Displacement,
Springs Act Against Radial and 
Vertical Displacement
 
Figure 2-15.  Boundary Condition at the Ends of the Ventlines 
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Figure 2-16.  Ventline Header Submodel 
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Figure 2-17.  Ventline Spring Locations 
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The outer extend of the personnel lock and equipment hatch is shown in Figure 2-18.  The end of 
the penetration included in the model extends 41’-6” from the centerline of the drywell.  At this 
point, the penetration reaches a roller support within the reactor building.  The end of the hatch is 
constrained against vertical displacement at this point.   
Elevation
27’-6”
Fixed Against
Vertical Displacement
 
Figure 2-18.  Boundary Condition at the End of the Hatch Penetration 
 
Finally, Figure 2-19 illustrates the boundary condition at the seismic lateral stabilizers.  These 
stabilizers are centered at an elevation of 82’-9” and have a diameter of 5’-3”.  There are 8 stabi-
lizers spaced at 45o around the circumference of the drywell cylinder.  The structural details in 
these regions allow the steel shell to move radially and vertically, but constrain the shell against 
lateral displacement.  Lateral motion for a cylindrical shell can be described as a twisting or rota-
tion in the azimuth direction (see CB&I, 1980, for structural detail). 
 
Figure 2-19.  Boundary Condition at the Stabilizers 
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2.4  Loading 
The load combinations for the Oyster Creek drywell stress and stability analyses are provided in 
the “Technical Specification for Primary Containment Analysis – Oyster Creek Nuclear Generat-
ing Station” (Reference 1-4 of GE, 1991a) and summarized in the previous GE analyses (GE 
1991a and b).  Based on the detailed discussion of the different load combinations in the GE re-
ports and the previous acceptance of their calculations, the following three load combinations are 
explored in this study: 
• Case IV – Refueling Condition, 
• Case V – Accident Condition, 
• Case VI – Post-Accident Condition. 
GE determined that these three load combinations essentially envelope all other scenarios, and 
therefore, define the governing set of load combinations.  Stress analyses are performed for all 
three of the above load combinations.  In addition, only Case IV – Refueling Condition, and 
Case VI – Post-Accident Condition, are examined for the stability (buckling) analysis.  The cur-
rent analysis assumes that these two conditions govern the potential buckling in the sandbed re-
gion since the accident condition does not produce significant compressive stresses in the 
containment.  
Each of the above load combinations includes a specific set of load types.  Among these, the 
dead, live, and equipment loads were applied in the GE analysis using calculated loads from an 
earlier study by Chicago Bridge & Iron (Reference 2.4.3 of Reference 1-4 of GE, 1991a).  This 
reference was not made available for the current study, and therefore, the loads documented by 
GE (Tables 2-5a through 2-5c of GE, 1991a) were adapted and applied to the current model. 
In addition, to the loads mentioned above, several other load types are required to complete the 
load combinations of interest.  These include seismic, water loads, and internal pressure, among 
others.  The set of loads applied for each load combination was extracted from the previous GE 
analysis (GE, 1991a) and the FSAR (FSAR, 2003) and is summarized in Table 2-2.  A descrip-
tion of each load type is given in following subsections. 
Table 2-2. Load Combination Components 
Load CombinationsLoad Type 
Refueling Condition Accident Post-Accident 
Load Source 
Dead Load – Gravity of Shell × × × General
Dead Loads – Shell Attachments × × × GE Report 
Penetration Loads × × × GE Report 
Compressible Material × × × GE Report 
Live Loads ×   GE Report 
Internal Pressure  ×  FSAR 
External Pressure ×   GE Report 
Hydrostatic Internal Pressure   × GE Report 
Seismic Loads × × × (flooded) FSAR 
Refueling Loads ×   GE Report 
Thermal Load at 292oF  ×  FSAR 
  
 
2 August 3, 2006, conference call between Sandia National Laboratories, NRC, and Exelon. 
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2.4.1  General Loads: Gravity, Dead, Penetration, and Compressible Material 
Loads 
This section describes the general loads that are applied in each of the load combinations consid-
ered in this study.  The first of these loads employs a distributed body force to apply gravitation 
forces to the model.  In ABAQUS, the user must define the material density, the model geome-
try, and the value for the acceleration of gravity to enable the simulation of gravity.  Since the 
current model is defined in units of inches, the gravity constant is defined as 386.4 in/s2.  In addi-
tion to the gravity load, a 0.0694 psi (10 psf) vertical load is applied to the exterior of the entire 
drywell shell.  This represents the weight of the compressible material that lies in the approxi-
mately 3” gap between the drywell shell and the surrounding concrete shield wall.     
The dead load for components attached to the drywell shell, but not explicitly modeled, are in-
cluded through the application of a series of surface traction loads.  The current study uses the 
loads defined in Table 2.5a of the previous GE analysis (GE, 1991a).  As mentioned earlier, 
these loads were compiled by an even earlier study by Chicago Bridge & Iron.  In the GE analy-
sis, these dead loads were applied by “smearing” the load from a specific item attached to the 
drywell shell along the circumference of the shell at the elevation the item is located.  In other 
words, the total load from an item or series of items was summed together and distributed along 
the entire 360o of the drywell.  Since the GE model was only a 36o slice of the drywell, 10% of 
the total load was then distributed along the slice as nodal loads applied at the appropriate eleva-
tion.  Here, the current model contains the entire 360o extent of the drywell shell.  Therefore, the 
location of these applied loads can be as specific as the information available.  Here, the region 
of application was defined on the drywell shell by “imprinting” the shape of the attachment.  
This imprinting creates surfaces within ABAQUS that can be used to define where a specific 
load is applied.  The load is applied by “smearing” it along the defined surface as a surface trac-
tion.  This smearing is similar to the method used in the GE analysis, but the load is smeared 
over the actual location on the shell where a piece of equipment or other items are attached in the 
real structure.  This method provides a more realistic loading condition in the model. 
In applying the surface tractions for the dead loads given in the GE analysis report (Table 2.5a of 
GE, 1991a), the drywell surface was imprinted with the locations of each item listed.  These lo-
cations were determined from a set of structural drawings of the drywell (CB&I, 1980).  Figure 
2-20 through Figure 2-24 illustrate the regions of application for each of the loads defined in the 
GE analysis report (GE, 1991a).  Figure 2-20 shows the region of application for the upper and 
lower spray headers.  The center of the application region is located at elevation 64’-6” and 37’-
3” for the upper and lower headers, respectively2.  Since the drawing or schematic showing the 
exact regions of attachment to the drywell shell was not provided, it was assumed that the region 
of attachment spans 3” in elevation both above and below the center points given above. There-
fore, the total width of the regions of load application is 6” in elevation.  The actual width of the 
region depends on the curvature of the drywell shell at each location.  The load is also assumed 
to extend around the entire circumference. 
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Figure 2-20.  Upper and Lower Spray Header Locations 
   
Figure 2-21 illustrates the regions of load application for the upper, middle, and lower weld pads 
(CB&I, 1980). Each of the weld pads covers a 8” diameter region imprinted onto the drywell 
shell.  In the actual structure, the weld pads are attached to interior surface of the drywell.  Based 
on the structural drawings of the weld pad layout, the center of the upper, middle, and lower 
weld pads are located at elevations 66’-3.2”, 61’-2”, and 54’-9”, respectively.  The number of 
weld pads and spacing along the drywell circumference also varies: 15 pads at 24o, 20 pads at 
18o, and 24 pads at 15o, respectively. 
 
Figure 2-21.  Weld Pad Locations 
Figure 2-22 shows the regions of load application for the top and bottom flanges, as well as the 
stabilizers (CB&I, 1980).  Each of these items is located in the cylinder region of the drywell.  
The top flange spans from and elevation of 96’-7.878” down to 94’-9”.  The bottom flange ex-
tends from 94’-9” down to 92’-8.5”.  Both of these loads are applied along the entire circumfer-
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ence of the cylinder.  The stabilizer load is applied at 8 circular regions spaced at 45o and cen-
tered at elevation 82’-9”.  Each of the stabilizer regions is 5’-3” in diameter.   
 
 
Figure 2-22.  Flange and Stabilizer Locations 
 
 
Figure 2-23 illustrates the load application regions for the upper and lower beam seats (CB&I, 
1980).  These are the attachment points of beam within the drywell sphere.  The imprinted region 
for the upper beam seats is approximately 12” wide and 51” high and centered at an elevation of 
46’-4.5”.  The spacing of the 20 seats around the circumference varies from seat to seat, and 
range from 12o to 25o30’.  These dimensions and spacings were derived using the structural 
drawings.  The imprinted region for the lower beam seats is approximately 12” wide and 13.5” 
high and centered at an elevation of 20’-11.125”.  The spacing of the 20 seats around the circum-
ference varies from seat to seat, and range from 11o45’ to 29o40’.  Since the surface imprints for 
6 of the lower beam seats overlapped other surface partitions for the thickened regions around 
the personnel lock and several ventlines, the height of the region of application was reduced in 
slightly to 10”.  This modification was introduced to avoid oddly shaped surfaces which can be 
problematic during the meshing of the geometry.  In addition, the load for the beam seats was 
distributed evenly among the 20 seats for both the upper and lower seats.  Due to the varying 
spacing of the beam seats, the load could have been distributed using tributary areas.  Since the 
exact makeup and details of the total load are unknown here, a simple even distribution was ap-
plied. 
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Figure 2-23.  Upper and Lower Beam Seat Locations 
 
 
Figure 2-24 shows the load application region for the personnel lock and equipment doors.  This 
area is essentially the thickened region of the drywell shell surrounding the penetration.  The 
penetration is centered at an elevation of 27’-3”.   
 
 
 
Figure 2-24.  Personnel Lock and Equipment Door Loads Application Region 
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The final load listed in the GE dead load Table 2-5a (GE, 1991a) is for the vents.  It is assumed 
that this additional load accounts for the portion of the ventline that was not modeled explicitly 
in the GE model.  Since the entire ventline is modeled in the current model, no additional load 
was applied to the structure. 
Table 2-3 summarizes the dead loads described above.  The total load given in Table 2-5a of the 
GE report (GE, 1991a), the total surface area from the current ABAQUS model, and the result-
ing applied traction are all provided.  The ABAQUS total area is the summed surface area for all 
of the regions of application for a given dead load case.  The traction is simply the total load di-
vided by the area.  These tractions are applied to the appropriate regions on the drywell shell in 
the vertical direction. 
Table 2-3. Dead Load Tractions 
Dead Load Case 
GE Total Load*  
kips 
ABAQUS Total Area**  
in2 
Traction***  
ksi  
Upper Header 36 15847.2 0.00227 
Lower Header 41 15848.1 0.00259 
Upper Weld Pads 52**** 754 0.06897 
Middle Weld Pads 59.2**** 1005.3 0.05889 
Lower Weld Pads 56.2**** 1206.4 0.04675 
Top Flange 20.1 28543.4 0.00070 
Bottom Flange 20.7 30571.1 0.00068 
Stabilizers 21.65 12508.7 0.00173 
Upper Beam Seats 1102 12688.3 0.08685 
Lower Beam Seats 556 --- --- 
      - Standard Size           389.2 2563.3 0.15184 
      - Reduced Size          166.8 811.7 0.20549 
Equipment Doors, Lock 169.1 11938.3 0.01416 
* GE Total Load – This is the total load reported in the Table 2-5a of the GE analysis report (GE, 
1991a). 
** ABAQUS Total Area – This is the total summed surface area from the current ABAQUS model 
for each of the dead load items listed in the GE report. 
*** Traction – This is the GE Total Load divided by the ABAQUS Total Area.  These tractions are 
applied to the appropriate regions for each dead load case.  The tractions are applied in the down-
ward or vertical direction.  
**** The GE Total Loads for the three weld pad loads given in Table 2-3 are the sum of two sepa-
rate loads for each set of weld pads in GE Table 2-5a. 
 
In addition to the above dead loads, the Oyster Creek has numerous penetrations that were not 
modeled explicitly in the current model.  These penetration loads are listed in Table 2-5b of the 
GE report (GE, 1991a).  Unfortunately, the penetration identification numbers provided in this 
table do not correspond to the penetration identification numbers given in the structural draw-
ing’s penetration schedule (CB&I, 1980).  Since the correlation between these two numbering 
systems could not be readily provided to the analyst, the loads from each penetration in the GE 
Table 2-5b (GE, 1991a) were summed to give a total load at each elevation and distributed along 
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the entire drywell circumference.  GE Table 2-5b documents penetration loads at 17 different 
elevations: 16’, 20’, 26’, 30’, 31’, 32’, 33’, 34’, 35’, 36’, 40’, 54’, 60’, 70’, 73’, 87’, and 90’.  
These elevations were assumed to be the centerline of the application region and extend 6” in 
elevation in each direction.  For example, the region of application for the penetration load at 33’ 
is from 32’-6” to 33’-6”.  The regions of application for each of the penetration elevations are 
shown in Figure 2-25 and Figure 2-26.  Typically, the total penetration load for a given elevation 
is distributed along the entire circumference of the drywell.  Gaps in the application regions do 
exist near the personnel lock and equipment hatch.  These regions are excluded from the applica-
tion region since the hatch is an explicitly modeled penetration and other penetrations do not 
pass through that region.  Figure 2-27 shows the application region for the penetration load at the 
16’ elevation.  The load is distributed in the drywell shell between the ventlines including within 
a portion of the thickened region around the ventlines.  The 16’ elevation penetration load is dis-
tributed along this identical region between each of the ventlines.    
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-25.  Penetration Load Application Regions in the Drywell Sphere 
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Figure 2-26.  Penetration Load Application Regions in the Drywell Cylinder 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-27.  Elevation 16’ Penetration Load Application Region Between the Ventlines 
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Table 2-4 provides a summary of the penetration load tractions applied to the current ABAQUS 
model.  The total load given in Table 2-5b of the GE report (GE, 1991a) is provides along with 
the total surface area from the current ABAQUS model and the resulting applied traction.  The 
ABAQUS total area is the total surface area for the region of application for a given penetration 
elevation.  The traction is simply the total load divided by the area.  These tractions are applied 
to the appropriate regions on the drywell shell in the vertical direction. 
Table 2-4. Penetration Load Tractions 
Penetration Load  
Elevation 
GE Total Load*  
kips 
ABAQUS Total Area** 
in2
Traction***  
ksi  
16’ 168.1 24169.7 0.006955 
20’ 11.2 23809.4 0.000470 
26’ 11.1 29530.9 0.000376 
30’ 50.5 29688.2 0.001701 
31’ 16.5 29836.7 0.000553 
32’ 0.75 30044.2 0.000025 
33’ 15.45 30342.4 0.000509 
34’ 28.05 30805.2 0.000911 
35’ 1.5 31616.3 0.000047 
36’ 1.55 31696.3 0.000049 
40’ 43.35 31702 0.001367 
54’ **** 7.85 31694.5 0.000248 
60’ 0.7 31694.5 0.000022 
70’ 5.75 15651.8 0.000367 
73’ 8.85 14953 0.000592 
87’ 1.0 14953 0.000067 
90’ 15.0 14953 0.001003 
* GE Total Load – This is the total load reported in the Table 2-5b of the GE analysis report (GE, 
1991a). 
** ABAQUS Total Area – This is the total summed surface area from the current ABAQUS model 
for each of the penetration load elevation listed in the GE report. 
*** Traction – This is the GE Total Load divided by the ABAQUS Total Area.  These tractions are 
applied to the appropriate regions for each penetration load elevations, and act in the downward 
or vertical direction.  
**** 54’ Elevation Loads – The loads for this elevation are centered at 53’-10” to avoid creating 
oddly shaped surfaces at the intersection with the lower weld pads. 
2.4.2  Seismic Load 
A full dynamic simulation of the governing seismic loading would be ideal in determining the 
resulting stresses.  GE applied this method by performing a dynamic using an appropriate time 
history.  In addition, the Oyster Creek FSAR (FSAR, 2003) states that a dynamic seismic analy-
sis was also performed by John A. Blume & Associates.  Neither this report nor the seismic 
ground motions were available for the current study.  Although, the FSAR states that this dy-
namic analysis by John A. Blume & Associates confirmed that the original static coefficients 
used by Chicago Bridge & Iron in the design of the structure were acceptable.  These static coef-
ficients are 22% laterally and 10% vertically (acting simultaneously) of the permanent gravity 
load.  The use of the static coefficients to simulate the seismic loading is justified due to the con-
firmatory nature of this study. 
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Since the degraded drywell containment (degradation described in Section 2.6) may potentially 
exhibit a different dynamic behavior than the original, as-designed containment, the suitability of 
using the static coefficients to approximate the seismic loading is uncertain.  In order to address 
this issue, a short study was conducted which compares the natural frequencies and associated 
mode shapes for the drywell in its original and degraded conditions.  The details of this study are 
included in the Appendix A (Section 9) of this document.  Since the frequencies and mode 
shapes proved relatively insensitive to the levels of degradation experienced in the Oyster Creek 
drywell, the use of the static seismic coefficients to simulate the seismic loading for the degraded 
structure is assumed to be acceptable.  
The static coefficients are applied to the current ABAQUS model using body forces.  The gravity 
loading in ABAQUS was utilized for this purpose.  In addition to the standard 1g gravity load, 
an additional 0.1g was applied downward and 0.22g was applied in one lateral direction, as per-
formed in the original design by CB&I.  Several orientations of the seismic lateral load were ex-
amined to determine the case that produced the highest stresses in the sandbed region.  The 
direction for the 0.22g lateral load that extends from the 180o azimuth to the 90o azimuth was 
determined to produce the highest stresses, in general, throughout the sandbed region.   
The 0.22g lateral seismic load was applied in the Accident and Refueling load cases.  For the 
Post-Accident load case, the drywell is flooded with water up to an elevation of 74’-6”.  The ad-
ditional seismic load from the mass of the water is introduced into the analysis by increasing the 
value of the acceleration of gravity for the lateral seismic load and applying it to the drywell 
shell model that does not include the water explicitly.  To determine the appropriate increase in 
the acceleration of gravity, the total mass of the drywell shell (degraded and undegraded) was 
computed within ABAQUS.  The total weight of the water flooding the drywell (20% removed 
for the reactor vessel, GE, 1991a) was computed and added to the weight of the drywell shell.  
The weight of the combined drywell shell and water for the degraded containment was deter-
mined to be 10.6 times the weight of the drywell shell allow, and 10.0 times for the undegraded 
shell.  Therefore, the lateral seismic load for the degraded analysis uses 2.3g, and the undegraded 
shell uses 2.2g.  These loads are applied to the entire drywell shell.  This method is extremely 
approximate, but judged appropriate based on the limited seismic information available.  It is 
assumed that the vertical seismic loads are unaffected by the presence of the water during the 
Post-Accident load condition.         
2.4.3  Refueling Condition Specific Loads: Live, External Pressure, and Refueling 
Loads 
For the refueling load condition, the head of the drywell is removed as illustrated in Figure 2-4.  
The additional weight on the cylindrical portion of the drywell is given as 561 lbs/in along the 
circumference (Ref. 2.4.3 of Ref. 1-4 of GE, 1991a).  This load is applied in the current model as 
a shell edge traction as shown in Figure 2-28. 
  
 
44
 
Figure 2-28.  Refueling Load on Drywell Cylinder 
In addition to the refueling cylinder load, the refueling load combination includes a 2 psi external 
load.  This load was applied to the entire exposed exterior surface of the drywell shell.   
The final refueling load combination specific item is the live loading.  The live loads for the dry-
well are provides in Table 2-5c of the GE report (GE, 1991a).  Table 2-5 summarizes the live 
loads and the applied tractions.  The region of live load application for each item is identical to 
the region of application for the dead load. 
Table 2-5. Live Load Tractions 
Live Load 
GE Total Load*  
kips 
ABAQUS Total Area**  
in2 
Traction***  
ksi  
Upper Header 4.2 15847.2 0.000265 
Lower Header 7.15 15848.1 0.000451 
Upper Weld Pads 20 754 0.026525 
Middle Weld Pads 20 1005.3 0.019895 
Lower Weld Pads 24 1206.4 0.019894 
Equipment Doors, Lock 115 11938.3 0.009633 
* GE Total Load – This is the total load reported in the Table 2-5c of the GE analysis report (GE, 
1991a). 
** ABAQUS Total Area – This is the total summed surface area from the current ABAQUS model 
for each of the live load items listed in the GE report. 
*** Traction – This is the GE Total Load divided by the ABAQUS Total Area.  These tractions are 
applied to the appropriate regions for each live load case.  The tractions are applied in the down-
ward or vertical direction.  
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2.4.4  Accident Condition Specific Loads: Internal Pressure and Thermal Loads 
The accident condition includes an internal pressure within the drywell of 44 psi at a temperature 
of 292oF (FSAR, 2003) due to the design basis accident (LOCA, loss of coolant accident).  This 
pressure is applied to the interior surface of the drywell shell above elevation 8’-11.25”, or the 
bottom of the sandbed.  However, the concrete floor within the drywell does extend up to an ele-
vation of 10’-3” with curbs extending between the ventlines up to an elevation of 12’-3”.  In the 
previous discussion of the boundary conditions, the interior concrete above the bottom of the 
sandbed is ignored and only the shell below elevation 8’-11.25” is fixed since it is surrounded by 
concrete on both sides.  The actual condition of the bond between the drywell shell and the con-
crete floor inside the drywell is not known.  If a small gap exists, it would be likely that gas 
could enter and pressurize the shell below the level of the concrete floor.  
In the previous GE accident condition analysis, the thermal stresses in the sandbed region were 
determined using a heat transfer analysis.  Specifically, this region is below the concrete floor at 
an elevation of 10’-3” and extends down to the bottom of the sandbed at 8’-11.25”.  Since there 
is not sufficient information and/or explanation provided in the GE report to reproduce the heat 
transfer analysis or apply the temperatures given in this region, the entire shell in the current 
analysis is set to 292oF down to an elevation of 8’-11.25”.  As stated above, the condition of the 
bond between the drywell shell interior and the concrete below 10’-3” is not known to the ana-
lyst.  A small gap would allow the temperature of the shell below 10’-3” to be heated uniformly. 
 The internal pressurization and heating of the shell down to the fixed boundary condition at ele-
vation 8’-11.25” produces a severe discontinuity in the drywell shell.  At the point in the shell 
just above 8’-11.25”, the increase in the temperature causes the steel shell to expand and the in-
ternal pressure forces the steel shell outward.  The high bending stresses in this region were 
originally designed to be tempered by the sand outside of the shell above elevation 8’-11.25”.  
Based in part on the previous reviewed and approved study be GE (GE, 1991a and b), the shell 
was determined to resist the potential accident condition without the sand present.  The sand in 
the sandbed region was subsequently.  Since the focus of this study was not to assess the deci-
sion to remove the sand, potentially conservative boundary conditions and applied loads (pres-
sure and thermal) were used here.  
2.4.5  Post-Accident Condition Specific Load: Hydrostatic Load 
The only post-accident condition specific loading is the hydrostatic load from the flooding of the 
drywell interior.  In this condition, the water fills the drywell from the top of the concrete floor at 
10’-3” up to the 74’-6” elevation.  Assuming a density of water at 62.3 lbs/ft3, the hydrostatic 
pressure in the drywell interior at 10’-3” is 4003 psf (0.02780 ksi).  This load reduces linearly to 
zero at the 74’-6” elevation.  Since the elevation that the water reaches in the ventlines extends 
below the 10’-3” elevation, the hydrostatic load in the ventlines increases appropriately with the 
distance from the top of the water at 74’-6”.  
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2.5  Material Properties 
The drywell shell was constructed out of A-212-61T Grade B pressure vessel steel.  The 
modulus of elasticity, E, has been reported as 29,500 ksi at temperatures from 70oF to 100oF, 
28,800 ksi at 200oF, and 28,300 ksi at 300oF (IPE, 1992).  The yield stress for the material is 
50.7 ksi from 70oF to 100oF, 46.1 ksi at 200oF, and 45.1 ksi at 300oF (IPE, 1992).  The coeffi-
cient of thermal expansion is assumed to be 6.5E-6oF-1.  The density of the steel is 0.283 lb/in3 
(GE, 1991b), which is equivalent to its value in the required ABAQUS density units, 7.324E-7 
kips-sec2/in4. 
2.6  Degraded Model 
Section 2.2 provides the steel plate thicknesses throughout the drywell in Oyster Creek’s as-
build state.  For over 20 years, the drywell has experienced extensive thinning due to corrosion.  
Since UT measurements have only been taken at a limit number of locations throughout the 
shell, the current analysis adopts average measured thickness values for different regions of the 
drywell reported by AmerGen.  Average values have been adopted to establish a “realistic” 
model that reflects the current conditions.   
Since uniform thinning was used in this analysis, any additional stress concentration that might 
occur at the location of a crack-like pit or a highly non-uniform region was not captured in this 
analysis.  While some pit data has been documented, it is not detailed enough to make any as-
sessment of these types of local defects.   
The cylinder, upper sphere, and middle sphere degraded thicknesses are based on the minimum 
average thickness values from recent documentation on the condition of the drywell shell up to 
2004 (AmerGen, April 7, 2006).  The minimum average values reported at any location within 
each of the cylinder, upper sphere, and middle sphere are 0.604”, 0.676”, and 0.678”, respec-
tively.  Due to ongoing corrosion, the thicknesses of the cylinder and middle sphere were further 
reduced.  A location in the cylinder shows a corrosion rate of 0.0003”/yr.  Based on 25 years of 
additional corrosion (2004 to 2029), the cylinder was modeled at a thickness of 0.585” (0.604” – 
0.00075”/yr x 25yr = 0.585”).  One location in the middle sphere shows an ongoing corrosion 
rate of 0.00075”/yr.  This leads to a thickness of the middle sphere of 0.670” (0.678” - 
0.0003”/yr x 25yr = 0.670”).  The knuckle is reduced slightly in thickness from 2.5625” to 2.54” 
(AmerGen, April 4, 2006).  These thicknesses are taken as uniform throughout the entire region 
and are summarized in Table 2-6.   
The middle sphere and thickened regions around penetrations are decreased in thickness by the 
same magnitude as the surrounding regions.  For example, the thickened middle sphere is re-
duced in thickness by 0.1” since the middle sphere is reduced by 0.1”.  The thin transition re-
gions that fall between the main regions are set typically to a thickness equal to the average of 
the surrounding plates, as described previously for the geometry without degradation.  Thick-
nesses in the cylinder stiffeners, hatch, and ventlines do not include any degradation and are 
equal to their as-built values.  
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Table 2-6. Main Drywell Shell Model Thicknesses, Original and Degraded 
Section 
Original 
Thickness, 
in 
Degraded 
Thickness, 
in 
Section 
Original 
Thickness, 
in 
Degraded 
Thickness, 
in 
Head 1.1875 N/C Reinforcing Around Ventlines 2.875 2.618 
Upper Cylinder 1.1875 N/C Lower Sphere Below Sandbed 1.154 N/C 
Main Cylinder 0.640 0.585 Bottom Sphere 0.676 N/C 
Knuckle 2.5625 2.54 Middle Sphere Thickened 1.0625 0.9625 
Upper Sphere 0.722 0.676 Reinforcing Around Hatch 2.625 2.525 
Middle Sphere 0.770 0.670 Lower Sphere 1.154 See below 
N/C – No Change 
For modeling the degradation in the sandbed region, the lower sphere was divided into 10 re-
gions to be assigned uniform thicknesses.  These regions extend from the centerline of one ven-
tline to the centerline of the adjacent ventline.  Each of these newly defined regions contains 
one-half of the two different, but adjacent, bays.  This was done in order to avoid placing the 
thickness discontinuity at the centerline between the ventlines, since this is typically the location 
of the highest stresses.  If the thickness jump was placed at this location, the stresses of interest 
would be difficult to interpret.   
The thickness values used in these 10 regions were defined based on a set of UT measurements 
from a study performed in 1993 (GPU Nuclear, 1993).  In these calculations, a selected set of 
thickness measurements were taken from the outside of the containment before the application of 
the epoxy coating.  Measurements are provided for each bay of the sandbed as shown in Figure 
2-29 for Bay 1.  The image in Figure 2-29 was extracted from the 1993 GPU Nuclear Calcula-
tion Sheet.  Since the set of thickness values are reported to be the thinnest areas (by visual in-
spection) in each bay, the averages used here are still biased conservative.  As stated above, the 
10 regions used in the analysis combine one-half of two adjacent bays.  For example, the thick-
nesses for points in the right half of Bay 3 are combined with the thicknesses for points in the 
left half of Bay 1 (Points 8, 9, 15, 18, and 19 in Figure 2-29).  This is continued around the cir-
cumference of the sandbed as shown in Figure 2-30.  In addition, the effects of locally thinner 
regions were explored by introducing two 30” by 18” regions under the ventlines of Bay 1 and 
Bay 13 as shown in Figure 2-31 for Bay 1 (labeled as the “Bathtub” in Figure 2-29).  These two 
Bays showed a concentration of thin points within a local region.  The GPU Nuclear Calculation 
sheet provided the approximate dimensions of the local thin region in Bay 1, but not for Bay 13.  
Due to a lack of information for Bay 13, the dimensions and placement of the local region in Bay 
13 were assumed to be identical to the region shown for Bay 1.   
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Local Bay 1 Region
Bay Combination 1-3 Bay Combination 19-1
Elevation
8’-11.25”
 
Figure 2-29.  Bay 1 UT Measurement Locations Taken from Outside of the Containment (Image 
Extracted from GPU Nuclear Calculation Sheet, 1993) 
 
Bay Combinations
1-3
3-5
19-1 17-19
15-17
Local Bay 1 Region
Elevation
8’-11.25”
 
Figure 2-30.  Lower Sphere Bay Combination Regions (Ventlines Removed for Clarity) 
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Local Bay 1 Region
Bay Combination 1-3 Bay Combination 19-1
Elevation
8’-11.25”
Region Embedded in Concrete
Elevation 10’-11”
Elevation 9’-11.4”18”
18” 12”
 
Figure 2-31.  Detailed View of Local Bay 1 Region (Ventline Removed for Clarity) 
The average of the datapoints that fall within each bay combination (e.g. Bay 1-3) was computed 
and assigned to the thickness in that defined region of the model.   
Table 2-7 summarizes the thicknesses throughout the lower sphere based on the average UT 
measurements.  Figure 2-32 illustrates the layout of the thicknesses prescribed to the bay combi-
nations in the lower sphere.  To explore the effects of significant local thinning, the lowest meas-
ured value at any point within the two local regions (Bay 1 and 13) was assigned as the uniform 
thickness throughout the entire 30” by 18” section.  The measurement values that fall within 
each of these local regions were not used in the averaging to define the uniform thickness as-
signed to the surrounding bay combinations.  A detailed description of the computation of these 
thicknesses is provided in Appendix B (Section 10). 
Table 2-7. Degraded Lower Sphere Shell Model Thicknesses 
Bay Combination Thickness, Degraded, inches 
Bay 1-3 0.894 
Bay 3-5 0.922 
Bay 5-7 0.998 
Bay 7-9 0.998 
Bay 9-11 0.835 
Bay 11-13 0.859 
Bay 13-15 0.842 
Bay 15-17 0.857 
Bay 17-19 0.904 
Bay 19-1 0.858 
Local Bay 1 Region 0.705 
Local Bay 13 Region 0.618 
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Elevation 8’-11.25”
Sphere Equator – Elevation 37’-3”
Elevation 23’-6”
Lower Sphere
Sandbed Region
Ventline Locations
Bay
Combinations
1-33-55-7 15-1717-1919-19-11 7-911-13 13-15 11-13
Local Bay 1 Region Local Bay 13 Region
0.8940.922 0.9040.8580.998 0.998 0.8570.835 0.8420.859 0.859
0.705 0.618  
Figure 2-32.  Degraded Thicknesses in the Lower Sphere (inches) 
 
 
2.7  Mesh Size 
The solid geometry describes in Section 2.2 was meshed within the ABAQUS/CAE utility.  A 
nominal mesh seed size of 4” was applied to the geometry.  Typically, this leads to elements 
sizes that have a 4” by 4” square dimension.  Due to the unique shape of the model and the sur-
face partitions introduced for application of the boundary conditions, loadings, and to divide the 
shell sections of different thickness, some elements contain edges slightly larger that 4” with 
some edges much smaller that 4”.  In the two local regions where the effects of more extensive 
degradation is explored, smaller elements (1” by 1”) are employed to better capture the poten-
tially high stresses.  As stated previously, the mesh used throughout the model adopts a quad-
dominated scheme.  This enables the meshing utility to insert 3-noded, or tri, elements when 
needed to avoid creating a poorly shaped quad element. 
A 4” element size was employed based on a limited mesh convergence study.  Models with 
nominal element sizes of 3”, 4”, and 5” were constructed using the accident load conditions.  For 
each of these meshes, the hoop stresses at the same location in the sandbed were compared at 
one point.  In addition, the meridional stresses at the same location in the sandbed were com-
pared at one point.   The meridional stresses at the point examined were not sensitive to the mesh 
size.  For the hoop stresses at the point examined, the percentage of area reduction for a typical 
element was compared to the percentage of hoop stress increase as the element size was reduced. 
 The area reduction percentage when going from a 5” nominal mesh to 4” nominal mesh was in 
excess of one order of magnitude larger than the percentage increase in the hoop stress.  In other 
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words, a significant reduction in the element size only lead to a slight increase in the stress.  The 
reduction of the element size from 4” to 3” produced a percentage ratio that was nearly two or-
ders of magnitude.  The percentage ratio of one order of magnitude was judged to be acceptable, 
and therefore, the 4” nominal element size mesh was adopted for all analyses in this study.   
Figure 2-33 illustrates the finite element mesh for the refueling load case.  This mesh contains 
245,192 shell elements.  Figure 2-34 shows a detailed view of the drywell cylinder mesh with the 
head removed.  The same identical mesh is used for perform the stress analyses of the contain-
ment in its original and degraded states, as well as for the eigenvalue buckling analyses. 
 
 
 
Figure 2-33.  Finite Element Mesh for the Refueling Load Case 
 
  
 
52
 
Figure 2-34.  Finite Element Mesh in the Drywell Cylinder for the Refueling Load Case 
 
Figure 2-35 illustrates the finite element mesh used for the accident and post-accident load cases. 
The mesh contains more elements than the refueling mesh with 263,446.  The additional ele-
ments are required due to the including of the head as shown in Figure 2-36.  As with the refuel-
ing mesh, this mesh is used for all accident and post-accident analyses. 
 
Figure 2-35.  Finite Element Mesh for the Accident and Post-Accident Load Cases  
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Figure 2-36.  Finite Element Mesh in the Drywell Cylinder and Head for the Accident and Post-
Accident Load Cases 
Figure 2-37 illustrates the mesh in the upper and middle sphere regions of the drywell.  The por-
tion of the personnel lock/equipment hatch modeled is also visible as well as the upper portion of 
the lower sphere and ventlines.  The mesh for the refueling case and the mesh for the accident 
and post-accident analyses are similar in these regions. 
 
 
Figure 2-37.  Finite Element Mesh in the Upper and Middle Sphere 
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Figure 2-38 shows the finite element mesh in the lower sphere, bottom sphere, and ventlines.  As 
stated for the upper and middle sphere, the meshes in these lower drywell regions are similar for 
the refueling and accident/post-accident models. 
 
Figure 2-38.  Finite Element Mesh in the Lower Sphere, Bottom Sphere, and Ventlines 
The mesh in the local thinned regions is shown in Figure 2-39.  While the meshes for the local 
thinned regions under the ventline for Bay 1 and 13 are not identical, they are similar with a typi-
cal element size equal to 1” x 1”.  The elements in these local thinned regions have been reduced 
in size compared to the surrounding mesh to better capture any potential stress concentrations.  
No detailed mesh convergence study was performed to determine the optimum element size in 
these regions. 
 
Figure 2-39.  Finite Element Mesh for the Local Thin Regions under the Ventlines in Bay 1 and 13 
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3.  Stress Analysis 
In this analysis, the structural integrity of the drywell shell is examined in terms of the stress lim-
its using a combination of the values used in the previous analysis by GE (GE, 1991a) and the 
current ASME code.  The GE analysis provided a description of the allowable stresses per the 
original design code (1962 ASME Code, Section VIII). Using this code, the appropriate code 
case (1272-N-5) was used to define the allowable primary and secondary stresses for the differ-
ent loading conditions.  Since the original pressure vessel steel used to construct the drywell 
shell has been designated, it was determined to be appropriate to adopt the original stress crite-
rion while also considering the current code.  The allowable stress based on the re-designated 
steel in the current 2004 ASME B&PV Code, Section III, Division 1, Subsection NE (ASME, 
2004) is slightly higher that the original value used by GE.  The use of the original value is 
therefore a conservative assumption.   
As reported in the GE report (GE, 1991a), the allowable stress, S, for the SA-212 Grade B steel 
used for the drywell is defined at 17.5 ksi.  The primary stresses include the general membrane 
stress and the general membrane plus bending stress.  For the refueling load case (Service Level 
B) and the accident load case (Service Level C), the allowable general membrane stress, Smc, 
were set equal to 1.1 times the allowable stress, or 1.1 x 17.5 = 19.3 ksi.  The general membrane 
plus bending stress is set equal to 1.5 times the general membrane allowable stress, or 1.5 x 19.3 
= 29 ksi.  The primary plus secondary stress is set equal to 3 times the allowable stress, or 3 x 
17.5 = 52.5 ksi.  Secondary stresses include thermal stresses and bending stresses at gross struc-
tural discontinuities (e.g. the intersection of two plates of different thickness).  For the post-
accident (Service Level D) load case, the general membrane, general membrane plus bending, 
and the primary plus secondary stress allowables are 38 ksi, 57 ksi, and 70 ksi.   
In the FSAR (FSAR, 2003), it is stated the steel designated SA-212 Gr. B has been superseded in 
the ASME code by SA-516 Gr. 70.  In the 2004 ASME code, Section II, Part D, Subpart 1, Table 
1A, the allowable stress at room temperature is given as 20 ksi.  Since this value is slightly larger 
than the 17.5 ksi used previously, the lower value of 17.5 ksi is used here.  When using this 
value for the allowable stress, S, the 2004 ASME Section III, Division I, Subsection NE, Class 
MC, Article NE-3000 (ASME, 2004), as well as the Standard Review Plan (SRP, 1996) pro-
duces similar values as compared to the allowables defined above by GE.  The allowables in the 
current code for “not integral and continuous” structures are slightly more conservative than 
those for “integral and continuous” structures, and produce the same allowables as describes 
above.  Therefore, these values are conservatively adopted here.  In addition, the allowables for 
primary plus secondary stresses for Level C and Level D do not need to be evaluated per the 
ASME Code.  For consistency with the previous GE analysis, these stresses are evaluated using 
the limits of 52.5 ksi and 70 ksi for Level C and D, respectively.   
The stress analyses comparison with the code allowables treats the peak surface stresses for the 
shell elements used in this analysis as membrane plus bending stresses.  If a case was encoun-
tered where the surface stress exceeded the membrane plus bending stress allowable, the stress 
value was explored further to determine if the surface stress resided at a gross structural discon-
tinuity.  In these cases, the stress values were considered to be primary plus secondary values 
and assessed using the higher stress limits defined in the ASME code. The results of the elastic 
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ABAQUS stress analyses for the Refueling, Accident, and Post-accident load cases are summa-
rized below.   
3.1  Refueling Condition 
The analyses of the refueling load condition employed the model and loadings described in Sec-
tion 2.  Two stress analyses were performed for the refueling load case.  These included the con-
tainment with and without degradation.  The thicknesses used for the upper portions of the 
degraded drywell are outlined in Table 2-6.  In the lower sphere of the drywell, the average UT 
measurement data was used to assign shell thicknesses as outlined in Table 2-7. Table 3-1 and 
Table 3-2 summarize the peak stresses for each of the analyses.  In each case and for each region 
of the containment, the peak membrane stresses are reported as well as the peak membrane plus 
bending stresses.  The membrane plus bending stresses are the surface stresses provided in the 
analysis output for each shell element.  The membrane stresses are taken at the midsection output 
value for each shell element.  The peak stresses in both the meridional and circumferential direc-
tions are provided.  Values given as positive represent tensile stresses, and values given as nega-
tive are compressive stresses.  The percentage of the ASME limit for each stress value is 
provided in parenthesis.  For each analysis, the stresses remain within ASME code allowables 
(Service Level B). 
Table 3-1. Refueling Load Case Peak Stresses with No Degradation, Primary Stresses (Percentage 
of ASME Limit in Parenthesis) 
Membrane Stresses, ksi Membrane + Bending Stresses, ksi Drywell Region 
Meridional Circumferential ASME Limit Meridional Circumferential ASME Limit 
Cylinder -1.31 (6.8) -1.33 (6.9) 19.3 -1.59 (5.5) -1.53 (5.3) 29 
Knuckle -0.59 (3.1) -2.06 (10.7) 19.3 -2.33 (8.0) -2.45 (8.4) 29 
Upper Sphere -2.49 (12.9) -0.88 (4.6) 19.3 -6.27 (21.6) -4.62 (15.9) 29 
Middle Sphere -4.45 (23.1) -2.08 (10.8) 19.3 -7.94 (27.4) -8.65 (29.8) 29 
Thickened Middle Sphere -2.71 (14.0) 3.89 (20.2) 19.3 -5.05 (17.4) -5.66 (19.5) 29 
Lower Sphere -5.02 (26.0) 6.05 (31.3) 19.3 -12.14 (41.9) 9.64 (33.2) 29 
Positive values are tension, negative values are compression.  ASME Limits based on stress magnitude. 
Table 3-2. Refueling Load Case Peak Stresses with Degradation, Primary Stresses (Percentage of 
ASME Limit in Parenthesis) 
Membrane Stresses, ksi Membrane + Bending Stresses, ksi Drywell Region 
Meridional Circumferential ASME Limit Meridional Circumferential ASME Limit 
Cylinder -1.43 (7.4) -1.44 (7.5) 19.3 -1.72 (5.9) -1.64 (5.7) 29 
Knuckle -0.60 (3.1) -2.08 (7.2) 19.3 -2.38 (12.3) -2.48 (8.6) 29 
Upper Sphere -2.71 (14.0) -1.01 (3.5) 19.3 -6.94 (36.0) -5.18 (17.9) 29 
Middle Sphere -5.51 (28.5) -2.58 (13.4) 19.3 -9.72 (33.5) -10.65 (36.7) 29 
Thickened Middle Sphere -3.15 (16.3) 4.99 (25.9) 19.3 -5.78 (19.9) 7.06 (24.3) 29 
Lower Sphere -6.37 (33.0) 8.00 (41.5) 19.3 -14.70 (50.7) 14.32 (49.4) 29 
Local Region 1 -5.01 (26.0) 3.94 (20.4) 19.3 -7.25 (25.0) 4.42 (15.2) 29 
Local Region 13 -5.02 (26.0) 3.91 (20.3) 19.3 -7.31 (25.2) 4.39 (15.1) 29 
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Figure 3-1, Figure 3-2, and Figure 3-3 show the meridional membrane stress distributions in the 
lower sphere regions for the refueling case without degradation, and with degradation.  Figure 
3-3 shows a detailed view of the local thin region in under the ventline in Bay 13.  Note that the 
scales for the color stress contours are not the same for the no degradation case and for the deg-
radation case.  The regions in light gray have tensile meridional stresses which are typically 
much lower in magnitude than the compressive stresses for this loading condition.  The merid-
ional membrane stress distribution is similar for each case, with the highest stresses near the bot-
tom of the sandbed and between the ventlines.  The local thin area in Figure 3-3 does not 
experience significantly higher stresses since the compressive load is typically lower beneath the 
ventlines and the load in that region is easily redistributed around the thin region. 
 
Figure 3-1.  Meridional Membrane Stress Distribution in the Lower Sphere for the Refueling Load 
Case with No Degradation (ksi) 
Local Bay 13 Region
 
Figure 3-2.  Meridional Membrane Stress Distribution in the Lower Sphere for the Refueling Load 
Case with Degradation (ksi) 
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Local Bay 13 Region
 
Figure 3-3.  Meridional Membrane Stress Distribution in Local Bay 13 Region for the Refueling 
Load Case with Degradation (ksi) 
 
 
3.2  Accident Condition 
The analyses of the accident load condition employed the model and loadings described in Sec-
tion 2.  Two analyses were performed for the stress analysis of the accident load case.  These in-
cluded the containment with and without degradation.  The thicknesses used for the upper 
portions of the degraded drywell are outlined in Table 2-6.  The degraded shell thicknesses for 
the lower sphere are outlined in  
Table 2-7.  Table 3-3 through Table 3-6 summarize the peak stresses for each analysis.  Table 
3-3 and Table 3-5 include the peak membrane stresses and the peak membrane plus bending 
stresses.  In addition, the peak primary plus secondary stresses are provided in Table 3-4 and 
Table 3-6.  These values are typically surface stresses that include the thermal stress component 
from the increase of the drywell shell from 70oF to the accident temperature of 292oF.  As for the 
refueling case, the peak stresses in both the meridional and circumferential directions are pro-
vided.  Values given as positive represent tensile stresses, and values given as negative are com-
pressive stresses.   
For each analysis, the stresses remain within ASME code allowables (Service Level C) with a 
few potential exceptions which required additional discussion.  The meridional membrane plus 
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bending allowable stress for the degraded analysis was exceeded in the upper sphere at the inter-
section with the knuckle.  This was then determined to be a gross structural discontinuity, and 
therefore, the stress in this region was well below the primary plus secondary stress allowable.   
The only remaining stress potentially exceeding the allowable is for the meridional and circum-
ferential primary plus secondary stresses at the bottom of the lower sphere.  These values are ex-
tremely large, exceeding the assumed allowable even for the case with no degradation.  The high 
stresses in this region are caused by a combination of the bending due to the internal pressure 
and the thermal expansion due to the increase in the temperature from 70oF to the accident tem-
perature of 292oF.  While the introduction of degradation does increase these stresses, it appears 
to be a secondary effect.  The model constructed in this study uses several approximations of the 
geometry and loading in this region.  These include the assumption that beginning the increase in 
temperature from 70oF while the service temperature is closer to 150oF.  Any potential stress re-
laxation due to the higher service temperature has been neglected.  In addition, the temperature 
in the entire sandbed region is raised to 292 oF and the internal pressure is applied to the inside of 
the drywell shell down to an elevation of 8’-11.25”.  The previous GE analysis included a heat 
transfer analysis to determine the thermal gradient in the drywell shell in the sandbed region due 
to the concrete slab within the drywell extending up to an elevation of 10’-3”.  Since the present 
condition of the bond between the drywell shell and the concrete between the elevations of 10’-
3” and 8’-11.25” is not currently know, the temperature and internal pressure were conserva-
tively extended down to 8’-11.25”.  These assumptions, especially the extension of the tempera-
ture down to the point of fixity (elevation 8’-11.25”), imposes a severe discontinuity in the shell 
as discussed in Section 2.4.4.  The potential conservativeness of the assumptions adopted here 
should be considered when interpreting the analysis results.  It should be noted that the sand that 
originally filled the sandbed was included in the original design to mitigate the bending stresses 
in this location.  The sand was removed based in part by the previous analysis by GE (GE, 
1991a).  In addition, the intent of this study was not to reinvestigate the acceptability of remov-
ing the sand since this was performed in the approved analyses by GE.  Finally, the ASME code 
does not require an evaluation for primary plus secondary stresses (stresses including thermal 
effects) for Level C loading.  The evaluation is performed here to remain consistent with the 
stress evaluation in the previous GE analysis. 
Table 3-3. Accident Load Case Peak Stresses with No Degradation, Primary Stresses (Percentage 
of ASME Limit in Parenthesis) 
Membrane Stresses, ksi Membrane + Bending Stresses, ksi Drywell Region 
Meridional Circumferential ASME Limit Meridional Circumferential ASME Limit 
Cylinder 6.80 (35.2) 14.02 (72.6) 19.3 12.15 (41.9) 14.90 (51.4) 29 
Knuckle 3.59 (18.6) 13.79 (71.5) 19.3 10.33 (35.6) 15.83 (54.6) 29 
Upper Sphere 12.73 (66.0) 13.68 (70.9) 19.3 28.86 (99.5) 16.43 (56.7) 29 
Middle Sphere 12.57 (65.1) 13.98 (72.4) 19.3 16.35 (56.4) 16.01 (55.2) 29 
Thickened Middle Sphere 10.61 (55.0) 11.13 (57.7) 19.3 13.68 (47.2) 12.27 (42.3) 29 
Lower Sphere 9.44 (48.9) 10.95 (56.7) 19.3 14.42 (49.7) 17.39 (60.0) 29 
Positive values are tension, negative values are compression.  ASME Limits based on stress magnitude. 
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Table 3-4. Accident Load Case Peak Stresses with No Degradation, Primary + Secondary Stresses 
(Percentage of ASME Limit in Parenthesis) 
Primary + Secondary Stresses, ksi Drywell Region 
Meridional Circumferential ASME Limit 
Cylinder 12.19 (23.2) 15.01 (28.6) 52.5 
Knuckle 10.37 (19.8) 15.89 (30.3) 52.5 
Upper Sphere 28.97 (55.2) 16.46 (31.4) 52.5 
Middle Sphere 17.34 (33.0) 15.99 (30.5) 52.5 
Thickened Middle Sphere 13.00 (24.8) 12.28 (23.4) 52.5 
Lower Sphere 82.51 (157.2) -62.71 (119.4) 52.5 
 
Table 3-5. Accident Load Case Peak Stresses with Degradation, Primary Stresses (Percentage of 
ASME Limit in Parenthesis) 
Membrane Stresses, ksi Membrane + Bending Stresses, ksi Drywell Region 
Meridional Circumferential ASME Limit Meridional Circumferential ASME Limit 
Cylinder 7.46 (38.7) 15.36 (79.6) 19.3 13.59 (46.9) 16.28 (56.1) 29 
Knuckle 3.63 (18.8) 13.96 (72.3) 19.3 10.47 (36.1) 16.02 (55.2) 29 
Upper Sphere 13.61 (70.5) 14.70 (76.2) 19.3 30.77 (58.6) 17.61 (60.7) 52.5 / 29 
Middle Sphere 14.45 (74.9) 16.59 (86.0) 19.3 20.12 (69.4) 18.29 (63.1) 29 
Thickened Middle Sphere 11.83 (61.3) 12.31 (63.8) 19.3 16.07 (55.4) 13.63 (47.0) 29 
Lower Sphere 13.24 (68.6) 14.73 (76.3) 19.3 27.11 (93.5) 24.62 (84.9) 29 
Local Region 1 8.91 (46.2) 13.46 (69.7) 19.3 15.46 (53.3) 15.36 (53.0) 29 
Local Region 13 10.13 (52.5) 14.41 (74.7) 19.3 17.29 (59.6) 16.45 (56.7) 29 
Positive values are tension, negative values are compression.  ASME Limits based on stress magnitude. 
Table 3-6. Accident Load Case Peak Stresses with Degradation, Primary + Secondary Stresses 
(Percentage of ASME Limit in Parenthesis) 
Primary + Secondary Stresses, ksi Drywell Region 
Meridional Circumferential ASME Limit 
Cylinder 13.60 (25.9) 16.31 (31.1) 52.5 
Knuckle 10.48 (20.0) 16.04 (30.6) 52.5 
Upper Sphere 30.80 (58.7) 17.61 (33.5) 52.5 
Middle Sphere 21.50 (41.0) 19.52 (37.2) 52.5 
Thickened Middle Sphere 14.79 (28.2) 14.21 (27.1) 52.5 
Lower Sphere 88.55 (168.7) -63.13 (120.2) 52.5 
Local Region 1 32.59 (62.1) 12.52 (23.8) 52.5 
Local Region 13 34.59 (65.9) 13.54 (25.8) 52.5 
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Figure 3-4 through Figure 3-7 illustrate the circumferential membrane stresses in the sandbed 
region of the cases without and with degradation.  Both cases are show with and without the ap-
plication of the thermal loading.  With dead loads and the internal pressure load, the sandbed re-
gion is in tension circumferentially.  The addition of the thermal loading causes sections of the 
sandbed region to go into compression due to the constraint at the point the drywell shell is em-
bedded within concrete below elevation 8’-11.25” and below the ventlines.  The sections of the 
sandbed and lower sphere that remain in tension are at significantly lower values due to the con-
straint provided by the ventlines.  For the degraded case prior to the application of the thermal 
load, the local thinned region in Bay 13 does experience higher stresses than the surrounding 
area as shown in Figure 3-6.  The thermal loads cause a significant reduction in the tensile 
stresses in this region.  As discussed previously, the meridional membrane plus bending stresses 
also experience significantly higher stresses.  Figure 3-8 illustrates the meridional membrane 
plus bending stresses, or the tensile stresses on the inside surface of the drywell shell, for the 
case without degradation after application of the internal pressure and thermal loads.  The ther-
mal expansion below the ventlines causes the sandbed region of the drywell shell to extend out-
ward.  This produces a significant stress concentration at the point the drywell shell becomes 
fixed within the concrete below elevation 8’-11.25”.  This bending stress concentration is high-
lighted in Figure 3-8 by the ring of red, orange, and yellow elements.  The bending at this loca-
tion is so severe the outside surface of the drywell shell is in significant compression, exceeding 
60 ksi in some regions.  It should be noted that the analyses performed here are elastic, and 
therefore, the stress reported do not include the effects of material yielding and plastic deforma-
tion.  As mentioned previously, the addition of degradation does increase the bending stresses in 
this region, but the degradation appears to be secondary to the basic geometry and the modeling 
assumptions in this location.   
 
 
Figure 3-4.  Circumferential Membrane Stress Distribution in Sandbed for the Accident Load Case 
with No Degradation (Internal Pressure without Thermal Load) (ksi) 
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Figure 3-5.  Circumferential Membrane Stress Distribution in Sandbed for the Accident Load Case 
with No Degradation (Internal Pressure with Thermal Load) (ksi) 
 
 
Figure 3-6.  Circumferential Membrane Stress Distribution in Sandbed and Local Thin Region Un-
der the Ventline in Bay 13 for the Accident Load Case with Degradation (Internal Pressure without 
Thermal Load) (ksi) 
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Figure 3-7.  Circumferential Membrane Stress Distribution in Sandbed for the Accident Load Case 
with Degradation (Internal Pressure with Thermal Load) (ksi) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-8.  Meridional Membrane Plus Bending Stress Distribution (Tension on the Inside Surface 
of the Drywell Shell) in Sandbed for the Accident Load Case with No Degradation (Internal Pres-
sure with Thermal Load) (ksi) 
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3.3  Post-Accident Condition 
The analyses of the post-accident load condition employed the model and loadings that are de-
scribed in the previous section.  Two analyses were performed for the stress analysis of the post-
accident load case. These included the containment with and without degradation.  The thick-
nesses for the upper portions of the degraded drywell are outlined in Table 2-6.  The thicknesses 
in the lower sphere of the drywell are outlined in Table 2-7. 
For the Post-Accident condition, Table 3-7 and Table 3-8 summarize the peak stresses for each 
analysis.  In each case and for each region of the containment, the peak membrane stresses are 
reported as well as the peak membrane plus bending stresses.  The membrane plus bending 
stresses are the surface stresses provided in the analysis output for each shell element.  The 
membrane stresses are taken in the midsection output value for each shell element.  The peak 
stresses in both the meridional and circumferential directions are provided.  Values given as 
positive represent tensile stresses, and values given as negative are compressive stresses.  For 
each analysis, the stresses remain within ASME code allowables (Service Level D). 
Table 3-7. Post-Accident Load Case Peak Stresses with No Degradation, Primary Stresses (Per-
centage of ASME Limit in Parenthesis) 
Membrane Stresses, ksi Membrane + Bending Stresses, ksi Drywell Region 
Meridional Circumferential ASME Limit Meridional Circumferential ASME Limit 
Cylinder -1.68 (4.4) -4.76 (12.5) 38 -4.25 (7.5) -6.96 (12.2) 57 
Knuckle -0.43 (1.1) -1.29 (3.4) 38 -1.99 (3.5) -1.58 (2.8) 57 
Upper Sphere 1.41 (3.7) 5.37 (14.1) 38 -4.65 (8.2) 6.39 (11.2) 57 
Middle Sphere 2.75 (7.2) 12.27 (32.3) 38 -5.44 (9.5) 12.61 (22.1) 57 
Thickened Middle Sphere -5.03 (13.2) 13.43 (35.3) 38 -10.22 (17.9) 15.90 (27.9) 57 
Lower Sphere -10.10 (26.6) 18.34 (48.3) 38 -25.00 (43.9) 21.36 (37.5) 57 
Table 3-8. Post-Accident Load Case Peak Stresses with Best Estimate Degradation, Primary 
Stresses (Percentage of ASME Limit in Parenthesis) 
Membrane Stresses, ksi Membrane + Bending Stresses, ksi Drywell Region 
Meridional Circumferential ASME Limit Meridional Circumferential ASME Limit 
Cylinder -1.80 (4.7) -4.87 (12.8) 38 -4.49 (7.9) -6.94 (12.2) 57 
Knuckle -0.40 (1.1) -1.19 (3.1) 38 -1.91 (3.4) 1.58 (2.8) 57 
Upper Sphere 1.44 (3.8) 5.92 (15.6) 38 -5.12 (9.0) 6.93 (12.2) 57 
Middle Sphere 3.19 (8.4) 14.13 (37.2) 38 -6.49 (11.4) 14.48 (25.4) 57 
Thickened Middle Sphere -5.58 (14.7) 17.25 (45.4) 38 -13.05 (22.9) 19.35 (33.9) 57 
Lower Sphere -13.21 (34.8) 24.04 (63.3) 38 -28.60 (50.2) 29.51 (51.8) 57 
Local Region 1 -7.24 (19.1) 17.31 (45.6) 38 -15.93 (27.9) 20.20 (35.4) 57 
Local Region 13 -8.87 (23.3) 20.31 (53.4) 38 -18.75 (32.9) 23.67 (41.5) 57 
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Figure 3-9 and Figure 3-10 illustrate the circumferential membrane stresses in the sandbed re-
gion for the post-accident load case, without degradation and with degradation, respectively.  
Note that the color stress contours used in these two figures are not set at the same scale.  The 
stresses in the degraded analysis are much larger than the case with no degradation.  The local 
thin region under the ventline in Bay 13 experiences higher stresses, but do not approach the al-
lowables. 
 
 
Figure 3-9.  Circumferential Membrane Stress Distribution in Sandbed for the Post-Accident Load 
Case with No Degradation (ksi) 
 
Figure 3-10.  Circumferential Membrane Stress Distribution in Sandbed and Local Thin Region 
Under the Ventline in Bay 13 for the Post-Accident Load Case with Degradation (ksi) 
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3.4  Conclusion 
The ASME allowable stresses are met for all three load cases examined here given the modeling 
and loading procedures outlined in Section 2.  The only potential exception is for the primary 
plus secondary stresses located at the base of the sandbed region of the accident condition due to 
the thermal expansion of the shell.  The primary cause of these high stresses is the number of 
modeling and loading assumptions in this region, with the introduction of degradation producing 
only a secondary effect.  In addition, the primary plus secondary stresses (includes thermal 
stresses) were compared to the allowables use in the previous GE analysis (GE, 1991a).  The 
current code does not require an evaluation of the primary plus secondary stresses for Service 
Level C, but were performed here for consistency with the previous study and since some 
evaluation of the shell was judged to be appropriate.  Beyond the stresses at the base of the sand-
bed region for the accident condition, the introduction of the degradation does cause a noticeable 
increase in the stress levels throughout the drywell shell for each load condition.  In general, the 
accident condition causes the largest stress increases throughout the containment when degrada-
tion is introduced.   
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4.  Stability Analysis 
In this analysis, the structural integrity of the drywell shell is examined in terms of stability using 
the ASME Code Case N-284, “Metal Containment Shell Buckling Design Methods, Section III, 
Division 1, Class MC.”  This stability analysis used the stresses computed through the stress 
analysis outlined in the previous section.  The refueling and post-accident load cases were as-
sumed to be the governing load combinations for potential buckling in the drywell.  The effec-
tive factors of safety against buckling were computed and compared to the required ASME code 
allowables. 
Here, the theoretical elastic buckling stress, σie, is computed using a combination of the stress 
analyses described in the previous section and a separate eigenvalue extraction analysis in 
ABAQUS.  The eigenvalue buckling analysis provides the load factors, λ, that cause buckling 
given the applied loads.  For each eigenvalue, or load factor, the analysis provides the resulting 
buckling mode or displaced shape.  Each load factor defines the multiplier on the applied loads 
that would cause the given buckling mode.  For example, a load factor of 4 indicates that the ap-
plied loads would need to be increased by a factor of 4 to cause that buckling mode to occur.  
The load factor can also be applied to the compressive stress value, σc, located in the buckling 
region to compute the buckling stress.  Therefore, the stress determined from the stress analysis 
of a specific load case and level of degradation is multiplied by the load factor computed in the 
eigenvalue buckling analysis to produce the theoretical elastic buckling stress, σie = λσc.  The 
same models used for the stress analyses in the previous section are used in the eigenvalue buck-
ling analyses. 
Since the theoretical elastic buckling stress does not take into account the imperfections that ex-
ist within any fabricated shell structure, σie is modified in N-284 by capacity and plasticity re-
duction factors.  This is necessary due to the buckling phenomenon being highly sensitive to 
imperfections.    
The capacity reduction factor, α, for an unstiffened sphere in uniaxial compression equals 0.207. 
 In the previous analysis by GE (GE, 1991b), they employed an increased capacity reduction fac-
tor due to the tensile stresses in the circumferential direction.  Article 1500 of N-284 and a refer-
ence by Johnson (Johnson, 1976), among others, were used to justify the use of an increased 
capacity reduction factor.  Article 1500 and the Johnson reference explain that an increase in 
buckling capacity have been observed in cases where circumferential tensile stresses are pro-
duced due to internal pressure.  This internal pressure has the effect of smoothing out the initial 
imperfections that are often the site of buckling initiation.  GE applied the method provided in 
the Johnson reference to increase the capacity reduction factor for examining buckling for both 
the post-accident and refueling load cases.  While the post-accident case includes an internal 
pressure from the flooded drywell, the refueling case has no internal pressure.  The circumferen-
tial tensile stresses in the sandbed region for the refueling case stem from the geometry of the 
structure.  Article 1500 of N-284 states clearly that an increased capacity reduction factor may be 
justified due to internal pressure.  Since no further justification was provided in the previous GE 
analysis to use this increased factor for cases with circumferential tensile stresses not due to in-
ternal pressure, this method was not adopted for the refueling load case.  However, since the 
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post-accident load case includes internal pressure, a modified version of the method used by GE 
is applied and described in a section describing the post-accident buckling results.  
The plasticity reduction factor, η, for spheres under uniaxial compression is provided in N-284.  
For values of Δ < 0.55, η = 1.0, and for values of 0.55 < Δ < 1.6, η = 0.45/Δ = 0.18, where Δ = 
ασie/σy and σy is the material yield strength. 
The compressive buckling stress, σc, can be evaluated using the reduced theoretical elastic buck-
ling stress that equal α η σie/FS, where FS equals the factor of safety.  The factor of safety equal 
2.0 for Service Level B (refueling) and 1.67 for Service Level D (post-accident).   
4.1  Refueling Condition 
For the refueling load case with no degradation, the fist buckling mode occurs at the upper beam 
seats in the middle sphere.  These locations are shown in Figure 2-23.  The load that the beam 
applies to the drywell shell is applied to these locations with surface tractions.  The original 
thickness of the middle sphere was 0.77 inches.  Figure 4-1 illustrates the buckled displaced 
shape for this mode with a load factor of 13.36.  The drywell shell buckles inward and down due 
to the load of the attached beam.  In the previous GE analysis, the load for the beam seats was 
smeared along the entire circumference of the drywell, and therefore did not predict this type of 
buckling mode.  Buckling modes are extremely dependent on the constraint conditions.  This 
model does not account for the possible constraint by the beam attached to the interior surface of 
the shell.  Without further study, it is not know if the attached beam would prevent the buckling 
in this region.  Even so, the N-284 buckling evaluation in Table 4-1 indicates that the compres-
sive stress in this region does not exceed the allowable stress for the case with no degradation.  
The effective factor of safety (inelastic instability stress divided by the applied compressive 
stress) equals 2.77 which is larger that the factor of 2 required for Service Level B loadings.  
Here, the compressive stress used in the buckling evaluation was taken at the element that shows 
the maximum buckled displacement (red region in Figure 4-1).  Subsequent buckling modes oc-
cur in other locations throughout the middle sphere, the cylinder, and then in the sandbed region 
of the lower sphere.   
 
Figure 4-1.  Buckling at the Upper Beam Seat for the Refueling Case with No Degradation 
  
 
69
Table 4-1. Buckling Evaluation at the Upper Beam Seat for the Refueling Load Case with No Deg-
radation 
Sphere Radius, in 420 
Sphere Thickness, in 0.77 
Material Yield Stress, ksi 38 
Elastic Modulus, ksi 29500 
Factor of Safety, FS 2 
Applied Meridional Compressive Stress from Analysis, σc, ksi 4.45 
Load Factor from Bucking Analysis, λ 13.36 
Theoretical Elastic Buckling Stress, σie = λσc, ksi 59.452 
Capacity Reduction Factor, α 0.207 
Reduced Elastic Instability Stress, σe = ασie, ksi 12.307 
Yield Stress Ration, Δ = σe/σy 0.324 
Plasticity Reduction Factor, η 1.0 
Inelastic Instability Stress, σi = ησe, ksi 12.307 
Allowable Compressive Stress, σall = σi/FS, ksi 6.153 
Applied Compressive Stress Percentage of Allowable, σc/σall * 100 72.3% 
Effective Factor of Safety, FSE = σi/σc 2.77 
  
 
For the refueling load case with no degradation, buckling is eventually predicted in the sandbed 
region as shown in Figure 4-2 with the evaluation outlined in Table 4-2.  The buckling occurs in 
two different regions of the sandbed, between the ventlines in Bays 1 and 3, and between the 
ventlines in Bays 17 and 19.  The largest displacements occur in the 1.154 inch thick shell be-
tween Bays 1 and 3.  Therefore, this location is used to evaluate the compressive buckling s-
tresses.  Table 4-2 shows that the effective factor of safety is 3.85 which exceeds 2. 
 
 
Figure 4-2.  Buckling in the Sandbed Region for the Refueling Case with No Degradation 
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Table 4-2. Buckling Evaluation in the Sandbed Region for the Refueling Load Case with No Deg-
radation 
Sphere Radius, in 420 
Sphere Thickness, in 1.154 
Material Yield Stress, ksi 38 
Elastic Modulus, ksi 29500 
Factor of Safety, FS 2 
Applied Meridional Compressive Stress from Analysis, σc, ksi 4.32 
Load Factor from Bucking Analysis, λ 18.61 
Theoretical Elastic Buckling Stress, σie = λσc, ksi 80.374 
Capacity Reduction Factor, α 0.207 
Reduced Elastic Instability Stress, σe = ασie, ksi 16.637 
Yield Stress Ration, Δ = σe/σy 0.438 
Plasticity Reduction Factor, η 1.0 
Inelastic Instability Stress, σi = ησe, ksi 16.637 
Allowable Compressive Stress, σall = σi/FS, ksi 8.319 
Applied Compressive Stress Percentage of Allowable, σc/σall * 100 51.9% 
Effective Factor of Safety, FSE = σi/σc 3.85 
  
Figure 4-3 and Table 4-3 illustrate the buckling in the upper beam seat for the refueling load case 
with degradation.  In this case, the thickness of the middle sphere has been reduced to 0.67”.  
Therefore, the stresses in this region increase leading to a decrease in the load factor (9.49).  This 
indicates that the applied loads are closer to causing the shell to buckle.  The N-284 evaluation 
produces an effective factor of safety equal to 1.96 which is just under the require value of 2.  As 
discussed previously, the constraint provided by the beam may affect the buckling predicted 
here. 
 
Figure 4-3.  Buckling at the Upper Beam Seat for the Refueling Case with Best Estimate Degrada-
tion 
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Table 4-3. Buckling Evaluation at the Upper Beam Seat for the Refueling Load Case with Best Es-
timate Degradation 
Sphere Radius, in 420 
Sphere Thickness, in 0.67 
Material Yield Stress, ksi 38 
Elastic Modulus, ksi 29500 
Factor of Safety, FS 2 
Applied Meridional Compressive Stress from Analysis, σc, ksi 5.39 
Load Factor from Bucking Analysis, λ 9.49 
Theoretical Elastic Buckling Stress, σie = λσc, ksi 51.15 
Capacity Reduction Factor, α 0.207 
Reduced Elastic Instability Stress, σe = ασie, ksi 10.59 
Yield Stress Ration, Δ = σe/σy 0.279 
Plasticity Reduction Factor, η 1.0 
Inelastic Instability Stress, σi = ησe, ksi 10.59 
Allowable Compressive Stress, σall = σi/FS, ksi 5.29 
Applied Compressive Stress Percentage of Allowable, σc/σall * 100 101.8% 
Effective Factor of Safety, FSE = σi/σc 1.96 
 
Figure 4-4 and Table 4-4 predict buckling in the sandbed region for the refueling load case with 
degradation.  In this analysis, sandbed Bay Combination 13-15 was the first to buckle at a thick-
ness of 0.842 inches.  This region is just adjacent to the local thin region (t = 0.618 inches) under 
the ventline in Bay 13.  Since Bay Combination 9-11 (t = 0.835 in) is thinner than 13-15, it is 
possible the local thin region adjacent to Bay Combination 13-15 aids in the initiation of the 
buckling of the entire region.  The effective factor of safety for this buckling mode is 2.15 which 
just exceeds the required value of 2. 
 
Figure 4-4.  Buckling in the Sandbed Region for the Refueling Case with Best Estimate Degrada-
tion 
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Table 4-4. Buckling Evaluation in the Sandbed Region for the Refueling Load Case with Best Es-
timate Degradation 
Sphere Radius, in 420 
Sphere Thickness, in 0.842 
Material Yield Stress, ksi 38 
Elastic Modulus, ksi 29500 
Factor of Safety, FS 2 
Applied Meridional Compressive Stress from Analysis, σc, ksi 4.47 
Load Factor from Bucking Analysis, λ 10.40 
Theoretical Elastic Buckling Stress, σie = λσc, ksi 46.49 
Capacity Reduction Factor, α 0.207 
Reduced Elastic Instability Stress, σe = ασie, ksi 9.62 
Yield Stress Ration, Δ = σe/σy 0.253 
Plasticity Reduction Factor, η 1.0 
Inelastic Instability Stress, σi = ησe, ksi 9.62 
Allowable Compressive Stress, σall = σi/FS, ksi 4.81 
Applied Compressive Stress Percentage of Allowable, σc/σall * 100 92.9% 
Effective Factor of Safety, FSE = σi/σc 2.15 
 
 
 
4.2  Post-Accident Condition 
The analysis of the post-accident load case with no degradation produces numerous spurious 
buckling modes prior to those determined to be realistic in nature.  These spurious modes occur 
at the ends of the ventlines and equipment hatch and are judged to be caused by the approximate 
boundary conditions used in those regions.  The first realistic buckling mode for the no degrada-
tion case occurs in the cylinder.  From the displaced shape for this buckling mode in Figure 4-5, 
it appears that it is caused by a combination of the additional lateral seismic load used for the 
flooded condition and the lateral constraints applied to the stabilizers.   
Table 4-5 summarizes the buckling evaluation.  Here the applied meridional compressive stress 
is actually taken as the minimum principal stress since the maximum compressive stresses in this 
region are slightly rotated from the meridional axis.  The effective factor of safety for this mode 
is 2.85 which exceeds the required 2.  When degradation is introduced, buckling first occurs in 
the critical sandbed region and not in the cylinder.  Therefore, an evaluation of buckling in the 
degraded cylinder has not been included here. 
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Figure 4-5.  Buckling in the Cylinder for the Post-Accident Load Case with No Degradation 
 
 
 
Table 4-5. Buckling Evaluation in the Cylinder for the Post-Accident Load Case with No Degrada-
tion 
Sphere Radius, in 198 
Sphere Thickness, in 0.640 
Material Yield Stress, ksi 38 
Elastic Modulus, ksi 29500 
Factor of Safety, FS 1.67 
Applied Meridional Compressive Stress from Analysis, σc, ksi 2.3 
Load Factor from Bucking Analysis, λ 13.75 
Theoretical Elastic Buckling Stress, σie = λσc, ksi 31.625 
Capacity Reduction Factor, α 0.207 
Reduced Elastic Instability Stress, σe = ασie, ksi 6.546 
Yield Stress Ration, Δ = σe/σy 0.172 
Plasticity Reduction Factor, η 1.0 
Inelastic Instability Stress, σi = ησe, ksi 6.546 
Allowable Compressive Stress, σall = σi/FS, ksi 3.920 
Applied Compressive Stress Percentage of Allowable, σc/σall * 100 58.7% 
Effective Factor of Safety, FSE = σi/σc 2.85 
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For buckling in the sandbed for the post-accident case, the allowable compressive stress is in-
creased to account for the additional buckling capacity due to the internal pressure.  A modified 
version of the procedure used by GE (GE, 1991b) is applied here.  The only difference in the 
standard N-284 procedure is in the computation of the reduced elastic instability stress, σe. 
Based on the method outlined by Johnson (Johnson, 1976), σe = ασie + ΔC(Et/r), where α and σie 
are computed the same as in N-284 with ΔC determined from a chart provided in Johnson (John-
son) and reprinted by GE (GE, 1991b).  The chart of ΔC requires the computation of the ‘X’ pa-
rameter, where X = (P/4E)(2r/t)2.  Here, P is the internal pressure within the vessel and is taken 
as the maximum hydrostatic pressure near the bottom of the sandbed, 0.0278 ksi.  GE applied a 
slightly modified version of this procedure by using the computed tensile stress in the buckled 
region to “back-out” an equivalent internal pressure.  They then used the ΔC chart to compute a 
modified capacity reduction factor.  The method used in the current study produces slightly 
lower allowable compressive stresses, and is therefore more conservative. 
Table 4-6 shows the buckling calculations in the sandbed region for the post-accident case with 
no degradation and is illustrated in Figure 4-6.  The largest displacement magnitudes for this 
buckling mode occur between the ventlines in Bays 17 and 19.  After adjusting for the circum-
ferential tensile stresses caused by the internal water pressure, the effective factor of safety is 
3.47 which exceeds the required 1.67 for Service Level D loading. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-6.  Buckling in the Sandbed Region for the Post-Accident Load Case with No Degradation 
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Table 4-6. Buckling Evaluation in the Sandbed Region for the Post-Accident Load Case with No 
Degradation 
Sphere Radius, r, in 420 
Sphere Thickness, t, in 1.154 
Material Yield Stress, ksi 38 
Elastic Modulus, E, ksi 29500 
Factor of Safety, FS 1.67 
Applied Meridional Compressive Stress from Analysis, σc, ksi 6.25 
Load Factor from Bucking Analysis, λ 13.94 
Theoretical Elastic Buckling Stress, σie = λσc, ksi 87.12 
Capacity Reduction Factor, α 0.207 
Internal Pressure, P, ksi 0.0278 
‘X’ Parameter, X = (P/4E)(2r/t)2 0.125 
ΔC (from Johnson, 1976) 0.095 
Reduced Elastic Instability Stress, σe = ασie+ΔC(Et/r) , ksi 25.73 
Yield Stress Ration, Δ = σe/σy 0.677 
Plasticity Reduction Factor, η 0.844 
Inelastic Instability Stress, σi = ησe, ksi 21.73 
Allowable Compressive Stress, σall = σi/FS, ksi 13.01 
Applied Compressive Stress Percentage of Allowable, σc/σall * 100 48.0% 
Effective Factor of Safety, FSE = σi/σc 3.47 
  
Figure 4-7 and Table 4-7 illustrate buckling in the sandbed for the post-accident load case with 
degradation.  Buckling first occurs in Bay Combination 13-15 at a thickness of 0.842 inches.  
This is just adjacent to the local thin region (t = 0.618 inches) under the ventline in Bay 13.  Af-
ter adjusting for the internal pressure effects, the effective factor of safety is 2.6 which exceeds 
the required 1.67. 
 
Figure 4-7.  Buckling in the Sandbed Region for the Post-Accident Load Case with Best Estimate 
Degradation 
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Table 4-7. Buckling Evaluation in the Sandbed Region for the Post-Accident Load Case with Best 
Estimate Degradation 
Sphere Radius, r, in 420 
Sphere Thickness, t, in 0.842 
Material Yield Stress, ksi 38 
Elastic Modulus, E, ksi 29500 
Factor of Safety, FS 1.67 
Applied Meridional Compressive Stress from Analysis, σc, ksi 7.99 
Load Factor from Bucking Analysis, λ 7.58 
Theoretical Elastic Buckling Stress, σie = λσc, ksi 60.53 
Capacity Reduction Factor, α 0.207 
Internal Pressure, P, ksi 0.0278 
‘X’ Parameter, X = (P/4E)(2r/t)2 0.234 
ΔC (from Johnson, 1976) 0.14 
Reduced Elastic Instability Stress, σe = ασie+ΔC(Et/r) , ksi 20.81 
Yield Stress Ration, Δ = σe/σy 0.547 
Plasticity Reduction Factor, η 1.0 
Inelastic Instability Stress, σi = ησe, ksi 20.81 
Allowable Compressive Stress, σall = σi/FS, ksi 12.46 
Applied Compressive Stress Percentage of Allowable, σc/σall * 100 64.1% 
Effective Factor of Safety, FSE = σi/σc 2.60 
 
4.3  Conclusion 
The buckling evaluation performed here using ASME N-284 show that based on the loadings 
and the model described in Section 2, both the refueling and post-accident load combinations 
met buckling requirements with a one exception.  The buckling at the upper beam seat for the 
refueling load case with degradation does not met the required factor of safety of 2.  As de-
scribed earlier, the potential constraint provided by the attached beam has not been included in 
this analysis. In all cases, the introduction of degradation causes a significant decrease in the ef-
fective factor of safety against buckling.  In the sandbed region, the degraded state analyzed in 
this study predicts an effective factor of safety of 2.15.  This model includes spatial variation in 
the degradation and two local areas with increased thinning.  In order to establish a minimum 
acceptable uniform thickness, an additional study was performed and is described in the next 
section. 
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5.  Sandbed Region Minimum Thickness Study 
In addition to the stress and stability analysis of the drywell shell using the average UT meas-
urements in the sandbed region (thicknesses described in Section 2.6, and analyses outlined in 
Sections 3 and 4), a minimum sandbed thickness study was also performed.  These analyses aim 
to establish the minimum uniform thickness in the sandbed region that maintains compliance 
with the ASME B&PV code.  The minimum acceptable shell thickness established here is based 
on a buckling (stability) analysis for the refueling load case.  The refueling load case appears to 
govern the potential for instability since a relatively low effective factor of safety was produced 
in the average UT measurement analysis at 2.15.  For Service Level B (refueling condition), a 
factor of safety of 2.0 is required by ASME N-284.   
The previous GE analysis (GE, 1991b) assumed a uniform sandbed shell thickness of 0.736”.  
Their analyses produced an applied compressive stress of 7.58 ksi in the sandbed region and an 
inelastic buckling stress of 21.30 ksi (per ASME N-284).  This produces an effective factor of 
safety of 2.81.  A subsequent calculation documented in a 1993 GPU Nuclear Calculation Sheet 
(GPU Nuclear, 1993) shows an applied compressive stress of 7.58 ksi in the sandbed region for a 
shell thickness of 0.736”, but with a lower value for the inelastic buckling stress at 15.18 ksi.  
This produces an effective factor of safety of 2.0, or at the required ASME N-284 value.   
The inconsistency between the two calculations appears to stem from a difference in the applica-
tion of the increased capacity reduction factor due to the tensile stresses in the circumferential 
(hoop) direction. This issue was discussed in detail in the previous stability analysis section.  Ar-
ticle 1500 of ASME N-284 states clearly that an increased capacity reduction factor may be jus-
tified if an internal pressure loading is present and causes tensile stresses in the circumferential 
direction.  This internal pressure aids in “smoothing” the initial imperfections and increased the 
buckling capacity under compressive meridional stresses.  The lack of an internal pressure load 
for the refueling load case prevents the justified use of an increased capacity reduction factor.  
As with the buckling calculations for the refueling load case in the previous section, the mini-
mum thickness study does not employ any increase in the capacity reduction factor. 
The shell thicknesses used in the minimum thickness study are summarized in Table 5-1 for re-
gions outside of the sandbed region.  The degraded thickness values for the majority of the dry-
well are equivalent to the values used in the average UT measurement analysis.  The only 
exception being the thickness assigned to the lower sphere above an elevation of 15’-6.8”, or the 
center of the ventlines.  In this region of the lower sphere (see Figure 5-1), the thickness is set to 
1.154”, or the nominal as-built value.  This remains consistent with inspections of the upper por-
tions of the lower sphere.  In the average UT measurement analysis, additional conservatism was 
introduced by degrading the entire lower sphere uniformly in each bay combination.  However, 
several confirmatory analyses performed during this study showed that the thickness assigned to 
the lower sphere above elevation 15’-6.8” has only a negligible effect since the buckling occurs 
in the sandbed below 15’-6.8”. 
In the lower sphere below elevation 15’-6.8” (sandbed region), the drywell shell is set to a uni-
form thickness.  This region is shown in Figure 5-1.  While the same finite element mesh was 
used as for the average UT measurement analyses, the local thinned regions under the ventlines 
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for Bays 1 and 13 are uniformly thinned consistent with the surrounding shell.  In addition, this 
study only examined the minimum thickness required in the sandbed region and not in the upper 
portions of the sphere or in the cylinder.   
 
Table 5-1. Main Drywell Shell Model Thicknesses Outside of Sandbed Region 
Section 
Original 
Thickness, 
in 
Degraded 
Thickness, 
in 
Section 
Original 
Thickness, 
in 
Degraded 
Thickness, 
in 
Head 1.1875 N/C Reinforcing Around Ventlines 2.875 2.618 
Upper Cylinder 1.1875 N/C Lower Sphere (below Sandbed) 1.154 N/C 
Main Cylinder 0.640 0.585 Bottom Sphere 0.676 N/C 
Knuckle 2.5625 2.54 Middle Sphere Thickened 1.0625 0.9625 
Upper Sphere 0.722 0.676 Reinforcing Around Hatch 2.625 2.525 
Middle Sphere 0.770 0.670 Lower Sphere (above El. 15’-6.8”) 1.154 N/C 
N/C – No Change 
 
 
Lower Sphere
Above Elevation 15’-6.8”
Thickness = 1.154”
Elevation
8’-11.25”
Elevation
15’-6.8”
Lower Sphere Below Elevation 15’-6.8” (Sandbed)
Thickness = Varied to Establish Minimum  
Figure 5-1.  Drywell Lower Sphere for Establishing a Minimum Thickness in the Sandbed Region 
(Ventlines and Hatch Removed for Clarity) 
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The thickness values assigned to the sandbed region were varied from 0.800” up to 1.050” with a 
concentration of analyses performed between 0.800” and 0.860”.  In the previous buckling 
analysis section, a buckling analysis was also performed for the undegraded drywell containment 
which included a uniform thickness of 1.154” throughout the sandbed region.  The results of 
each of these analyses are summarized in Figure 5-2.  Here, the effective factor of safety is plot-
ted against the associated shell thickness in the sandbed region.  This study shows that a thick-
ness of 0.844” is required in the sandbed region to produce an effective factor of safety equal to 
the ASME N-284 value of 2.0.   
Figure 5-2 also plots the datapoint established in the previous buckling analysis section using 
average UT measurement data.  In that analysis, the bay combination that buckled first was set to 
a thickness of 0.842” and resulted in an effective factor of safety equal to 2.15.  Although the 
thicknesses used in the minimum thickness analysis and the average UT measurement analysis 
are essential equivalent, there are several important factors that produce the difference in safety 
factors.  First, the average UT measurement analysis included two locally thinned regions that, in 
general, cause lower effective factors of safety for buckling in the adjacent bays than without the 
locally thinned regions.  However, the effect of the locally thinned is outweighed by the exis-
tence of bay combinations with thickness far exceeding 0.842” (see Figure 2-32).  For the aver-
age UT measurement analyses, 5 out of the 10 bay combinations were assigned thicknesses near 
or above 0.9”.  The existence of thicker bays enables a redistribution of the compressive loads 
leading to buckling.  Therefore, the average UT measurement analysis produced an effective fac-
tor of safety of 2.15 with a thickness of 0.842”, while the minimum thickness study produced an 
effective factor of safety of 2.0 with a thickness of 0.844”.  In the minimum thickness study, the 
entire sandbed region was uniformly thinned which prevents any redistribution of the load 
through thicker shell regions.  The effect of the locally thinned regions was not rigorously ex-
plored in the average UT measurement analyses, but it is likely that the effective factor of safety 
of 2.15 would increase without the presence of the locally thinned region. 
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Figure 5-2.  Effective Factor of Safety Values Computed for Various Thicknesses in the Sandbed 
Region for the Refueling Load Combination 
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Figure 5-3 and Table 5-2 illustrate the buckling location and ASME N-284 calculations for the 
sandbed with a thickness of 0.844”.  The major displacements for the first buckling mode in the 
sandbed are located between the ventline in Bays 1 and 3.   
 
 
Figure 5-3.  Buckling in the Sandbed Region with a Thickness of 0.844” for the Refueling Load 
Combination 
Table 5-2. Buckling Evaluation for the Refueling Load Case with a Thickness of 0.844” in the 
Sandbed 
Sphere Radius, in 420 
Sphere Thickness, in 0.844 
Material Yield Stress, ksi 38 
Elastic Modulus, ksi 29500 
Factor of Safety, FS 2 
Applied Meridional Compressive Stress from Analysis, σc, ksi 4.78 
Load Factor from Bucking Analysis, λ 9.67 
Theoretical Elastic Buckling Stress, σie = λσc, ksi 46.19 
Capacity Reduction Factor, α 0.207 
Reduced Elastic Instability Stress, σe = ασie, ksi 9.56 
Yield Stress Ration, Δ = σe/σy 0.252 
Plasticity Reduction Factor, η 1.0 
Inelastic Instability Stress, σi = ησe, ksi 9.56 
Allowable Compressive Stress, σall = σi/FS, ksi 4.78 
Applied Compressive Stress Percentage of Allowable, σc/σall * 100 100.0% 
Effective Factor of Safety, FSE = σi/σc 2.00 
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6.  Summary of Assumptions 
The study performed for this program required a number of assumptions.  A summary of the 
most significant assumptions is provided below. 
• The Accident and Post-Accident load combinations are assumed to govern the stress 
analysis.  
• The Refueling and Post-Accident load combinations are assumed to govern the buckling 
(stability) analysis.   
• Information of the loads applied to the finite element model was taken from the previous 
study by GE.  These loads were not independently verified. 
• The seismic loading was applied using static coefficients provided in the Final Safety 
Analysis Report (FSAR, 2003).  The static coefficients were applied using body forces in 
both the vertical and lateral directions.  The displacement time histories (ground motions) 
were not made available for this study.  The body forces used for the seismic loads were 
increased in the post-accident load combination to account for the mass of the water 
flooding the drywell. 
• The ventlines were modeled down to the intersection with the ventline header.  Here, 
springs acting in the radial and vertical directions were added to approximate the compli-
ance of the ventline header.  The spring constants were based on a simple submodel 
analysis of the ventline header.  Since the ventline is connected to the torus with a flexi-
ble bellow, all interaction between the ventline and torus was neglected. 
• The ventline jet deflector was modeled as a solid plate.  In reality, the deflector has mul-
tiple holes throughout the plate.  The thickness of the solid plate in the current model was 
reduced to account for the holes. 
• In a number of cases, the exact location that a specific load acts upon the drywell shell 
was not known.  The magnitude and elevation of these loads were provided in the GE re-
port, but the azimuth locations remained unknown.  In these cases (mainly in the case of 
the penetration loads), the loads were distributed along the entire circumference of the 
drywell as a surface traction. 
• The loads applied to the drywell shell were “smeared” along a region defined on the shell 
surface.  Typically, the region of application was taken as the area where an item is actu-
ally attached to the shell in the real structure.  As mentioned above, the penetration loads 
were smeared along the entire circumference since loads for individual penetrations were 
not provided. 
• The spacing of the upper and lower beam seats around the circumference is not constant, 
but the appropriate load distribution at each seat was not known.  The loads for the upper 
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and lower beam seats were distributed equally at each point of attachment to the drywell 
shell.  
• The concrete that fills the drywell shell interior from an elevation of 8’-11.25” to 10’-3”, 
and the additional curbs, have not been accounted for in this model.  The drywell shell is 
assumed encased in concrete below elevation 8’-11.25” (bottom of sandbed).   
• For the accident load combination, the internal 44 psi pressure and the thermal load of 
292oF (starting at 70oF) were applied to the entire drywell shell down to an elevation of 
8’-11.25”.  The concrete within the interior of the drywell shell extends up to 10’-3” with 
curbs extending up to 12’-3”.  Since the bond between the steel shell and the concrete is 
not known, it was assumed that a gap could exist which would enable gas to pressurize 
and heat the shell down to 8’-11.25”, or the bottom of the sandbed region on the exterior 
of the shell.  Even if no gap exists initially, it is likely that the initial pressurization (pres-
sure << 44 psi) acting on the shell above elevation 10’-3” would cause a gap to open.  
This would allow heated gas to flow between the shell and concrete. 
• The Personnel Lock & Equipment Hatch penetration geometry (extent modeled and 
thicknesses assigned) was approximated and the outer surface fixed against vertical dis-
placement.   
• The coefficient of thermal expansion for the A-212-61T Grade B pressure vessel steel 
used for the drywell was assumed to be 6.5E-6oF-1.   
• A number of assumptions were made to develop the thicknesses assigned to the model in 
its degraded state.  Section 2.6 provides a detailed discussion of these items. 
• A very limited mesh convergence study was performed which led to the use of a 4” nomi-
nal element size.  It was assumed that this mesh size was acceptable even though all load 
combinations were not examined in the convergence study and no checks on buckling 
were performed using different mesh sizes.  In addition, a 1” nominal mesh size was used 
in the two local regions under the ventlines in Bay 1 and 13.  No checks were performed 
to assess the mesh size in these regions. 
• Several assumptions were made in developing the ASME stress limits.  These are dis-
cussed in Section 3. . 
• ASME Code Case N-284 was used to assess the stability of the degraded drywell shell.  
It was assumed that since the refueling case does not include any internal pressure, that 
the increase in buckling capacity used by GE for cases with circumferential (hoop) ten-
sion was not appropriate.  Since the post-accident load case includes internal pressure, an 
increase in the capacity was applied. 
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7.  Conclusions 
The structural integrity of the degraded Oyster Creek drywell shell has been analyzed in this 
study.  The allowable stresses and the buckling stability were both examined in accordance with 
the ASME B&PV code.  The ASME allowable stresses are met for all three load cases examined 
here given the modeling and loading procedures outlined in Section 2.  The only potential excep-
tion is for the primary plus secondary stresses located at the base of the sandbed region of the 
accident condition due to the thermal expansion of the shell.  There are a number of modeling 
and loading assumptions in this region that may contribute to the stress magnitudes recorded in 
the current analysis.  In addition, the primary plus secondary stresses were compared to the al-
lowables use in the previous GE analysis (GE, 1991a).  The current code does not require an 
evaluation of the primary plus secondary stresses for Service Level C.  However, these stresses 
were assessed in this report to be consistent with the previous evaluation by GE.  The buckling 
evaluation performed here using ASME N-284 show that based on the loadings and the model 
described in Section 2 both the refueling and post-accident load combinations met buckling re-
quirements with a one exception.  The buckling at the upper beam seat for the refueling load case 
with degradation does not meet the required factor of safety of 2.  As described in Section 4, the 
potential constraint provided by the attached beam has not been included in this analysis.  Table 
7-1 summarizes the major conclusions for this study and for the previous GE analyses. 
Table 7-1. Comparison of Conclusion Between GE Study (GE, 1991a and b) and the Current Study  
Current Study Conclusion GE Study Conclusion 
The ASME B&PV stress analysis of the de-
graded Oyster Creek drywell shows all values 
within code limits.  The current study uses 
average UT measurement data to assign 
thicknesses in the sandbed region.  (Note that 
some primary plus secondary stresses for the 
accident condition are of concern as dis-
cussed in Section 3.) 
The ASME B&PV stress analysis of the de-
graded Oyster Creek drywell shows all values 
within code limits.  The GE study assumed a 
conservative uniform thickness of 0.736” in the 
sandbed region. 
ASME B&PV Code Case N-284 stability analy-
sis of the degraded Oyster Creek drywell 
shows that acceptable factors of safety are 
met.  The current study uses average UT 
measurement data to assign thicknesses in 
the sandbed region.  (Note that the buckling 
at the upper beam seats produces an effec-
tive factor of safety slightly less than 2 for the 
refueling load case, but this may be affected 
by the modeling of that specific detail.)  
ASME B&PV Code Case N-284 stability analysis 
of the degraded Oyster Creek drywell shows 
that acceptable factors of safety are met.  The 
GE study assumed a conservative uniform 
thickness of 0.736” in the sandbed region. 
The minimum uniform shell thickness re-
quired to meet the ASME N-284 buckling 
safety factor was determined to be 0.844” in 
the sandbed region.  This thickness was es-
tablished using the buckling analysis for the 
refueling load case. 
The minimum uniform shell thickness required 
to meet the ASME N-284 buckling safety factor 
was determined to be 0.736”.  This thickness 
was established using the refueling load case. 
(The thickness of 0.736” was established in a 
calculation by GPU Nuclear, 1993.  This calcula-
tion included an increase in the capacity reduc-
tion factor not used in the current study.)  
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The assessments performed here employ a uniform thinning of the drywell shell over large sec-
tions of the surface.  The thicknesses assigned in each region were based on limited measure-
ment data since a very small percentage of the shell has been examined.  In many cases, the raw 
data was not available.  This led to the use of averages provided by AmerGen throughout the 
relevant documentation.   
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9.  Appendix A – Natural Frequency Extraction 
An eigenvalue extraction was performed to calculate the natural frequencies for the degraded 
drywell shell in addition to the drywell shell in its original condition.  This analysis was per-
formed to assess the potential effects of degradation on the dynamic behavior of the drywell con-
tainment during a seismic event.  The change in the natural frequencies when introducing 
degradation can provide justification for using a simplified static seismic analysis.  The FSAR 
(FSAR, 2003) for Oyster Creek include the static seismic coefficients used in the original design 
of the drywell.  If only minor differences exist between the natural frequencies for the contain-
ment in its original condition (the condition used to establish the static coefficients) and the con-
tainment in its degraded state, the dynamic behavior of the containment would not be 
significantly altered by the degradation.  Therefore, the same static seismic coefficients could be 
applied when simulating the seismic loading for the degraded containment as for the as-built 
containment. 
The model used previously for the stress and buckling analyses was modified and used to per-
form a natural frequency extraction in ABAQUS.  Initial attempts to extract the natural frequen-
cies for the drywell structure used the same model described in Section 2.  That model included a 
section of the personnel lock/equipment hatch and the 10 ventlines down to the intersection with 
the ventline header.  The natural frequency extraction analyses that included these penetrations 
resulted in spurious modes where the displacements of each mode concentrated at the ends of the 
penetrations.  At these locations, the boundary conditions are approximated and applied to the 
structure as described in Section 2.  These applied boundary conditions and approximated ge-
ometry cause these spurious, or unrealistic, mode shapes.  In order to avoid these spurious 
modes, the geometry of the drywell was simplified by removing the hatch and ventline penetra-
tions.  The resulting “holes” in the drywell shell were subsequently “filled-in” with solid mate-
rial to avoid spurious mode shapes with deformation concentrated around the holes.  This results 
in the geometry illustrated in Figure 9-1.  The nodes along the bottom of the sphere below eleva-
tion 8’-11.25” are fixed in all directions and the seismic stabilizers are fixed against lateral dis-
placement as described for the full model in Section 2.   
The thicknesses for the drywell with and without degradation are summarized in Table 9-1.  The 
degraded thicknesses in the cylinder and upper sections of the sphere are the same as in the aver-
age UT measurement analysis.  The thickness of the entire lower sphere is set to a uniform value 
of 0.835” for the natural frequency extraction of the degraded drywell.  This region is high-
lighted in Figure 9-2.  The thickened reinforcing plates surrounding the hatch and ventlines in 
the actual structure are not thickened in the frequency extraction performed here.  These simpli-
fications in the geometry enable a general assessment of the effects of degradation on the natural 
frequencies. This analysis was not intended to provide the exact frequencies for the drywell 
structure, but only to justify the use of the static seismic coefficients for the seismic loading 
component of the stress and buckling analyses.  Therefore, the assumptions (e.g. the use of 
0.835” for the thickness in the lower sphere and the simplified geometry) are judged to be ac-
ceptable in order to study the general effect of degradation on the natural frequencies. 
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Figure 9-1.  Modified Model for Natural Frequency Extraction 
 
 
Table 9-1. Drywell Shell Thicknesses for Natural Frequency Extraction Analyses 
Section 
Original 
Thickness, 
in 
Degraded 
Thickness, 
in 
Section 
Original 
Thickness, 
in 
Degraded 
Thickness, 
in 
Head 1.1875 N/C Middle Sphere 0.770 0.670 
Upper Cylinder 1.1875 N/C Bottom Sphere 0.676 N/C 
Main Cylinder 0.640 0.585 Middle Sphere Thickened 1.0625 0.9625 
Knuckle 2.5625 2.54 Lower Sphere Below Sandbed 1.154 N/C 
Upper Sphere 0.722 0.676 Lower Sphere in Sandbed and Above 1.154 0.835 
N/C – No Change 
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Figure 9-2.  Lower Sphere Region (Highlighted in Red) Set to a Thickness of 0.835” for the De-
graded Natural Frequency Extraction 
 
The lowest 5 frequencies and mode shapes from the ABAQUS eigenvalue extraction are illus-
trated in Figure 9-3 and Figure 9-4 for the containment without and with degradation, respec-
tively.  The frequencies show only minimal decreases with the introduction of degradation with 
the lowest frequency dropping from 20.46Hz to 19.12Hz.  The differences are smaller at the 
higher frequencies (modes 2 through 5).  The displacements for each of the mode shapes are 
nearly identical.  The first mode is a vertical extension of the drywell, or stretching mode.  The 
second and third modes are overturning modes where the drywell is “bent” between the cylindri-
cal and spherical sections of the structure.  The forth and fifth modes are compressive modes 
where the cylinder is compressed down vertically toward the drywell sphere.  These shapes are 
generally consistent between the analyses with and without degradation.  Table 9-2 summarizes 
the comparison of the frequencies for the two analyses.  Since the effects of the degradation on 
the frequencies and associated mode shapes are minimal, the use of the original design static 
seismic coefficients is judged to be acceptable. 
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Mode 0
Base State
Mode 1
freq = 20.46Hz
Mode 2
freq = 23.78Hz
Mode 3
freq = 23.80Hz
Mode 4
freq = 27.89Hz
Mode 5
freq = 27.93Hz
 
Figure 9-3.  Base State and the First 5 Frequencies and Mode Shapes for the Drywell Containment 
with No Degradation 
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Mode 0
Base State
Mode 1
freq = 19.12Hz
Mode 2
freq = 23.26Hz
Mode 3
freq = 23.26Hz
Mode 4
freq = 27.52Hz
Mode 5
freq = 27.56Hz
 
Figure 9-4.  Base State and the First 5 Frequencies and Mode Shapes for the Drywell Containment 
with Degradation 
Table 9-2. Summary of the First 5 Natural Frequencies for Drywell with and without Degradation 
Mode Frequency - No Degradation, Hz Frequency - Degraded Model, Hz
1 20.46 19.12 
2 23.78 23.26 
3 23.80 23.26 
4 27.89 27.52 
5 27.93 27.56 
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10.  Appendix B – Sandbed UT Measurement Data and 
Shell Thickness Development 
For modeling the degradation in the sandbed region, the lower sphere was divided into 10 re-
gions to be assigned uniform thicknesses.  These regions extend from the centerline of one ven-
tline to the centerline of the adjacent ventline.  Each of these regions contains one-half of the two 
different, but adjacent, bays.  This was done in order to avoid placing the thickness discontinuity 
at the centerline between the ventlines, since this is typically the location of the highest stresses.  
If the thickness jump was placed at this location, the stresses of interest would be difficult to in-
terpret.  An example of the bay combinations is illustrated in Figure 10-1.  Here, half of Bay 1 
and half of Bay 2 are combined to create Bay Combination 1-3.  The measurement points indi-
cated on the images (GPU Nuclear, 1993) were taken from the outside of the containment shell 
prior to the application of the epoxy coating.  For Bay Combination 1-3, Points 8, 9, 15, 18, and 
19 were taken from the left half of Bay 1 and Points 1, 2, 3, and 7 were taken from the right half 
of Bay 3, and averaged.  The thicknesses for these points were reported in the GPU Nuclear cal-
culations (GPU Nuclear, 1993) and are provided in Table 10-1.  This average was assigned as a 
uniform thickness to the region highlighted in light red in Figure 10-1 and shown on the model 
in Figure 2-30.  The points that fall within the “bathtub” region (Points 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 
13, 20, and 21) under the ventline in Bay 1 were not included in the average for the adjacent bay 
combinations.  The minimum measured thickness (Point 3) in this region was assigned to the en-
tire Local Bay 1 region as outlined in Figure 10-1 and shown on the model in Figure 2-31. 
Local Bay 1 Region
Elevation
8’-11.25”
Ventlines
Bay Combination 1-3
 
Figure 10-1.  Bay 1 and Bay 3 UT Measurement Locations Taken from Outside of the Containment 
(Images Extracted from GPU Nuclear Calculation Sheet, 1993) 
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Table 10-1 through Table 10-4 and Figure 10-2 through Figure 10-11 provide the individual 
datapoints (GPU Nuclear, 1993) and the grouping used to compute the averages for all of the bay 
combinations summarized in Table 2-7.  The bay combinations are assembled and averaged in 
the same manner as for Bay Combination 1-3 in Figure 10-1.  The Local Bay 13 is shown in 
Figure 10-8 with thickness provided in Table 10-4.  As with the Local Bay 1 region, the mini-
mum measured value (Point 7) in the defined region was assigned as a uniform thickness. 
Table 10-1. UT Measurement Data for Bay Combinations 1-3, 3-5, 5-7, and 7-9. 
Bay Combination 1-3
Bay UT Point Shell Thickness, in
1 8 0.805
1 9 0.805 
1 15 1.156 
1 18 0.917 
1 19 0.89 
3 1 0.795 (min) 
3 2 1.00 
3 3 0.857 
3 7 0.826 
1-3 average 0.894
Bay Combination 3-5
Bay UT Point Shell Thickness, in
3 4 0.898
3 5 0.823 
3 6 0.968 
3 8 0.78 (min) 
5 1 0.97 
5 2 1.04 
5 3 1.02 
5 4 0.91 
5 5 0.89 
3-5 average 0.922
Bay Combination 5-7
Bay UT Point Shell Thickness, in
5 6 1.06
5 7 0.99 
5 8 1.01 
7 1 0.92 (min) 
7 2 1.016 
7 3 0.954 
7 4 1.04 
5-7 average 0.998
Bay Combination 7-9
Bay UT Point Shell Thickness, in
7 5 1.03
7 6 1.045 
7 7 1.00 
9 1 0.96 
9 2 0.94 (min) 
9 3 0.994 
9 4 1.02 
7-9 average 0.998
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Table 10-2. UT Measurement Data for Bay Combinations 9-11, 11-13, and 13-15. 
Bay Combination 9-11 
Bay UT Point Shell Thickness, in 
9 5 0.985
9 6 0.82 
9 7 0.825 
9 8 0.791 
9 9 0.832 
9 10 0.98 
11 1 0.705 (min) 
11 2 0.77 
11 7 0.831 
11 8 0.815 
9-11 average 0.835
Bay Combination 11-13 
Bay UT Point Shell Thickness, in 
11 3 0.832
11 4 0.755 
11 5 0.831 
11 6 0.800 
13 1 0.672 (min) 
13 2 0.722 
13 3 0.941 
13 4 0.915 
13 9 0.924 
13 13 0.932 
13 17 0.807 
13 18 0.825 
13 19 0.912 
13 20 1.17 
11-13 average 0.859
Bay Combination 13-15 
Bay UT Point Shell Thickness, in 
13 12 0.885
13 16 0.829 
15 1 0.786 (min) 
15 2 0.829 
15 3 0.932 
15 4 0.795 
13-15 average 0.842
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Table 10-3. UT Measurement Data for Bay Combinations 15-17, 17-19, and 19-1. 
Bay Combination 15-17 
Bay UT Point Shell Thickness, in 
15 5 0.85
15 6 0.794 
15 7 0.808 
15 8 0.77 
15 9 0.722 
15 10 0.86 
15 11 0.825 
17 1 0.916 
17 2 1.15 
17 3 0.898 
17 4 0.951 
17 5 0.913 
17 9 0.72 (min) 
17 10 0.83 
15-17 average 0.857
Bay Combination 17-19 
Bay UT Point Shell Thickness, in 
17 6 0.992
17 7 0.97 
17 8 0.99 
17 11 0.77 
19 1 0.932 
19 2 0.924 
19 3 0.955 
19 4 0.94 
19 5 0.95 
19 8 0.753 (min) 
19 9 0.776 
17-19 average 0.904
Bay Combination 19-1 
Bay UT Point Shell Thickness, in 
19 6 0.86
19 7 0.969 
19 10 0.79 
1 6 0.76 
1 7 0.70 (min) 
1 14 1.147 
1 16 0.796 
1 17 0.86 
1 22 0.852 
1 23 0.85 
19-1 average 0.858
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Table 10-4. UT Measurement Data for Local Bay 1 and 13 Regions. 
Local Bay 1 Region 
Bay UT Point Shell Thickness, in 
1 3 0.705 (min)
1 4 0.76 
1 5 0.71 
1 12 0.724 
1 13 0.792 
1 1 0.72 
1 2 0.716 
1 10 0.839 
1 11 0.714 
1 20 0.965 
1 21 0.726 
1 min 0.705
Local Bay 13 Region 
Bay UT Point Shell Thickness, in 
13 5 0.718
13 10 0.728 
13 14 0.868 
13 6 0.655 
13 7 0.618 (min) 
13 8 0.718 
13 11 0.685 
13 15 0.683 
13 min 0.618
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Local Bay 1 Region
Bay Combination 1-3 Bay Combination 19-1
Elevation
8’-11.25”
 
Figure 10-2.  Bay 1 UT Measurement Locations Taken from Outside of the Containment (Image 
Extracted from GPU Nuclear Calculation Sheet, 1993) 
Bay Combination 3-5 Bay Combination 1-3
Elevation
8’-11.25”
 
Figure 10-3.  Bay 3 UT Measurement Locations Taken from Outside of the Containment (Image 
Extracted from GPU Nuclear Calculation Sheet, 1993) 
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Bay Combination 5-7 Bay Combination 3-5
Elevation
8’-11.25”
 
Figure 10-4.  Bay 5 UT Measurement Locations Taken from Outside of the Containment (Image 
Extracted from GPU Nuclear Calculation Sheet, 1993) 
Bay Combination 7-9 Bay Combination 5-7
Elevation
8’-11.25”
 
Figure 10-5.  Bay 7 UT Measurement Locations Taken from Outside of the Containment (Image 
Extracted from GPU Nuclear Calculation Sheet, 1993) 
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Bay Combination 9-11 Bay Combination 7-9
Elevation
8’-11.25”
 
Figure 10-6.  Bay 9 UT Measurement Locations Taken from Outside of the Containment (Image 
Extracted from GPU Nuclear Calculation Sheet, 1993) 
Bay Combination 11-13 Bay Combination 9-11
Elevation
8’-11.25”
 
Figure 10-7.  Bay 11 UT Measurement Locations Taken from Outside of the Containment (Image 
Extracted from GPU Nuclear Calculation Sheet, 1993) 
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Bay Combination 13-15
Bay Combination 11-13
Elevation
8’-11.25”
Local Bay 13 Region
 
Figure 10-8.  Bay 13 UT Measurement Locations Taken from Outside of the Containment (Image 
Extracted from GPU Nuclear Calculation Sheet, 1993) 
Bay Combination 15-17 Bay Combination 13-15
Elevation
8’-11.25”
 
Figure 10-9.  Bay 15 UT Measurement Locations Taken from Outside of the Containment (Image 
Extracted from GPU Nuclear Calculation Sheet, 1993) 
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Bay Combination 17-19 Bay Combination 15-17
Elevation
8’-11.25”
 
Figure 10-10.  Bay 17 UT Measurement Locations Taken from Outside of the Containment (Image 
Extracted from GPU Nuclear Calculation Sheet, 1993) 
Bay Combination 19-1
Bay Combination 17-19
Elevation
8’-11.25”
 
Figure 10-11.  Bay 19 UT Measurement Locations Taken from Outside of the Containment (Image 
Extracted from GPU Nuclear Calculation Sheet, 1993)
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